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The shift towards a fair-value-oriented balance sheet receives divided opinions. The 
debate centers on whether fair value reporting is more relevant for financial statement users 
compared to historical cost. The first chapter of my dissertation investigates the relevance of fair 
value estimates in the context of bond pricing. Using a sample of US industrial firms, the main 
test compares the debt relevance, defined as the contemporaneous association between balance 
sheet variables and the bond risk premium, between firms having fair-value-oriented balance 
sheets and firms having historical-cost-based balance sheets. Results show that assets measured 
at fair value are more relevant for bond pricing, particularly those valued under level 2 and level 
3 of the Fair Value Hierarchy. In contrast, liabilities measured at historical cost are more relevant 
for bond pricing. These findings are robust with respect to alternative model specification and 
self-selection issues. Overall, the first chapter of my dissertation documents new evidence that 
assets and liabilities measured at fair value are not equally relevant for bond pricing. 
The second chapter of my dissertation investigates the impact of fair value reporting on a 
firm’s debt structure. A firm’s debt structure reflects its choices about short-term versus long-
term borrowing, the priority of debt claims among different lenders, and the variety of lender 
types. Prior literature largely ignores the heterogeneity of debt structures, treating debt as a single 
claim. Borrowing from theories in the finance literature, I hypothesize and test the impact of fair 
value reporting on three distinct features of the debt structure: maturity dispersion, debt variety, 
and debt prioritization. Using a series of tests, I show that firms with a higher percentage of 
assets and liabilities measured at fair value (fair-value firms) have more concentrated maturity 
profiles, fewer types of lender, and less prioritized debt, as compared to historical-cost firms. 
Further, these effects come from fair value assets, not fair value liabilities. Additional evidence 
largely supports the idea that fair value reporting impacts debt structures by reducing information 
asymmetry between borrowers and lenders. The second chapter of my dissertation contributes to 
the literature by providing new evidence on the impact of fair value reporting on firms’ debt 
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CHAPTER 1:  
THE IMPACT OF FAIR VALUE DISCLOSURE ON BOND RISK PREMIUM 
1.1. Introduction 
For US public firms, debt is one important source of financing1. Some firms borrow at 
lower rates than others because they have lower credit risks. Demonstrated by prior studies, a 
firm’s credit risk is related to its accounting information2. But the nature and type of accounting 
information has shifted over the years. One controversial shift is the transition from a historical-
cost-oriented balance sheet to a fair-value-oriented balance sheet. There is a debate on whether 
fair value is or is not useful for creditors. At one end of the spectrum, advocates of fair value 
disclosure believe that the usefulness of the information lies in its timeliness and the reduction of 
uncertainty. At the other end, opponents argue that fair values, especially those measured at level 
2 and level 3 of the Fair Value Hierarchy3, contain significant measurement error and extensive 
use of management discretion. In trying to understand the issues in this debate, this study 
investigates the relevance of fair value estimates in the context of bond pricing. In particular, do 
fair-value-oriented balance sheets better explain the bond risk premium, compared to historical-
cost-oriented balance sheets? 
The prior literature on fair value topics, though informative, cannot directly speak to this 
question. Fair value estimates, documented as having incremental association with the equity 
price4, are considered relevant for equity investors. But such equity relevance does not lead to 
debt relevance for the following reasons. Fair value information about residual profit, to which 
                                                 
1 According to Securities Industry and Financial Market Association (SIFMA), as of 2016, corporate bond issuance 
totaled $1.5 trillion while equity issuance totaled $197 billion  
2 See Altman and Saunders (1998) and Bellovary et al. (2007) for a review of existing studies on credit risk  
3 To determine fair value, various inputs can be used. Level 1 inputs are quoted price for identical assets and 
liabilities. Level 2 inputs are based on observable inputs for similar assets and liabilities. Level 3 inputs are 
unobservable and require management estimation.  




shareholders are entitled, may not be as important for creditors. Fair value information about 
credit risk, which creditors fully bear, may not be as important for shareholders. Moving to fair 
value debt relevance, extant studies provide mixed findings. On one hand, fair value is not 
relevant for lenders, because fair value covenants are excluded in loan contracting5. One the 
other hand, fair-value-based leverage ratio is relevant for bond investors in assessing credit risk 
(Blankespoor et al., 2013), but the fair values shown to be useful in financial firms, i.e., loans 
and deposits, are not common in industrial firms. For industrial firms, there still lacks 
understanding on the fair value usefulness for bond investors, and this study fills an important 
void in the literature.   
Among many types of accounting information, this study chooses to focus on the balance 
sheet because of its theoretical connection to bond pricing. The bond risk premium, defined as 
the expected return (yield) of the bond in excess of the risk-free rate, reflects the market 
assessment of a firm’s credit risk. The valuation of credit risk, suggested by credit risk models 
(Merton, 1974) and rating agencies (Moody’s KMV®), relies on balance sheet information. 
Specifically, credit risk hinges on the probability that the value of firm's total assets falls below 
the firm’s liabilities.  
Do fair value estimates provide more information than historical cost information for the 
purpose of assessing credit risk? Fair value, defined as the price received to sell an asset or the 
price paid to transfer a liability in an orderly market transaction, is vastly different from the past-
transaction-price-based historical cost6. Fair value for both assets and liabilities incorporate 
                                                 
5 Li 2010, Demerjian et al 2016, Ball Li Shivakumar 2015 find banks exclude accounting-based covenants in loan 
contracting after the shift towards fair value. 
6 ASC820-10-55-3 discusses three valuation approaches regarding fair value: market approach, cost approach and 
income approach. Cost approach uses the price that would be required to replace the service capacity of an asset, 
with the assumption that this replacement cost reflect another market participant's valuation to acquire a substitute 
asset of comparable utility. Income approach is based on discounted cash flow model. Regardless of the approaches 




market and firm specific information on a timely basis. The credit risk model suggests that 
timely signals regarding the assets and liabilities values allow investors to precisely measure 
credit risk. However, fair value estimates may be subject to measurement error and management 
discretion, which hinders credit risk assessment. Thus, the main hypothesis in this paper is that 
reporting more assets and liabilities at fair value in the balance sheet explains more of bond risk 
premium, compared to historical cost.  
Before testing the hypothesis, I first classify firms by the extent to which their balance 
sheets report assets and liabilities at fair value. Firms with large (small) percentage of book 
assets and book liabilities measured at fair value are coded as having high(low) fair value 
exposure. The hypothesis predicts firms with high (low) fair value exposure should have balance 
sheets that are more (less) relevant for bond pricing. To quantify relevance, two approaches were 
used. The first approach employs Merton’s credit risk model (1974) to generate bond risk 
premiums, using balance sheet information including the book value of total assets, the book 
value of total liabilities and the volatility of book assets. Relevance is evaluated based on the 
goodness of fit between the model-generated risk premium and the market-based risk premium7. 
The second approach bypasses the Merton’s model and regress the market-based risk premium 
on balance sheet variables. The model fit obtained from this regression produces an alternative 
measure of relevance.  
 To conduct necessary empirical tests, I obtain market-based bond risk premium from 
bond transactions in the secondary market reported in the Trade Reporting and Compliance 
Engine (TRACE). Subject to my sample selection and matching procedure, the sample consists 
of 83,054 bond-quarter observations between year 2005 and 2014 for 712 industrial firms. 
                                                 




Results suggest a fair-value-oriented balance sheet better explains bond risk premium as 
compared to historical cost. 
Since fair value estimates apply to both assets and liabilities, a natural question is 
whether the relevance comes from fair value assets or fair value liabilities. The results suggest 
that assets are more relevant when measured at fair value, compared to historical cost. Further 
partitioning the sample based on Fair Value Hierarchy shows that level 2 and level 3 assets 
contribute more to the relevance. This finding is consistent with the idea that the information 
about level 1 assets is already available in the marketplace whereas only through disclosure does 
the market obtain information for level 2 and level 3 assets. Next, I examine the relevance of fair 
value liabilities. Inconsistent with my hypothesis, fair-value-based liabilities does not outperform 
reporting historical-cost-based liabilities for bond pricing. 
To further explore why fair-value-based liabilities lack relevance, I examined the effect 
of nonperformance risk (reporting entity’s own credit risk) on fair value liability usefulness. 
Nonperformance risk, mandated by FAS No.157 to consider the effect of reporting entity’s credit 
risk on the reported fair value of the liabilities, is widely criticized for distorting the firm’s 
financial health. To test the role of nonperformance risk, I use a subsample with relatively low 
levels of non-performance risk. Firms in the subsample are characteristically large, have low 
asset volatility and high credit ratings. The lack of relevance is attenuated for the subsample, 
suggesting the inclusion of nonperformance risk in fair value liabilities impairs relevance. 
 A potential self-selection issue may bias the estimated fair value relevance. Firms expecting 
higher benefit from fair value disclosure can self-select to report more assets and liabilities at fair 




self-select into the high fair value exposure group. Matching firms on key variables that drive 
such reporting decision, the effect of high fair value exposure still holds. 
The mechanism behind the debt relevance of fair value assets can be revealed from the 
firm’s bond term structure. The term structure of bond risk premium plots the risk premium 
against time to maturities. For two groups of otherwise identical firms, theory predicts that their 
term structures should vary considerably, if one group has “perfect accounting information” and 
another group has “noisy accounting information” (Duffie and Lando, 2001). Perfect (noisy) 
accounting information, defined as how closely (poorly) the book value of assets tracks the 
fundamental value of the firm, alters the term structure by reducing the uncertainty related to 
credit risk. I posit that assets measured at fair value (historical cost) track fundamental value 
more (less) closely. Following a test in Yu (2005), results show that firms with high percentage 
of book assets reported at fair value differ in the term structure when compared to another set of 
firms with book assets reported at historical cost.  
 This study makes several contributions. First it adds to the debate on fair value relevance 
for bond investors. Before the shift towards fair value took place, many studies show accounting 
information was useful for credit risk assessment (Altman and Saunders, 1998 and Bellovary et 
al., 2007). After the shift, studies provide mixed evidence regarding the relevance of fair value 
for debtholders. Contributing to the on-going debate, this study adds new evidence by focusing 
on industrial firms and examine relevance in the context of bond pricing, for which the evidence 
was lacking.  
Additionally, this study adds to the literature methodology wise by separately analyzing 
the relevance of fair value assets and liabilities. Prior literature attempts to find a clear-cut 




findings on fair value debt relevance warrant further investigation. Using both credit risk model 
and reduced form test, this study is able to separately analyze the debt valuation relevance of fair 
value asset and fair value liability. This study provides new evidence, by showing the differential 
debt relevance between fair value assets and fair value liabilities. Last but not least, this study 
provides information that updates the IASB and the FASB on the relevance of fair-value-
oriented balance sheets to debt investors.  
1.2. An Overview of the Literature  
1.2.1 Credit risk and the value of risky debt 
 I first discuss credit risk valuation before developing an argument on how fair value 
estimates can influence bond pricing. Typical bond investors receive periodic interest payments8. 
But bonds can default, so bond investors demand a risk premium in exchange for bearing credit 
risk. Several measures for credit risk are discussed below. Rating agencies, such as Fitch and 
S&P, integrate information from multiple sources and produce a credit rating to reflect the 
probability that the borrower may fail to service its debt. Firms with high ratings typically enjoy 
lower borrowing cost (Elton et al., 2001). Credit events are instances when the borrower violates 
pre-defined covenants, misses interest payments, fails to repay principal or files for bankruptcy. 
Bond risk premium, which equals the expected return of a bond (or bond yield) 
subtracted by the maturity matched risk-free rate. Compared to sticky ratings and infrequent 
bankruptcy events, the bond risk premium reflects a firm’s credit risk9, based on secondary 
market transactions.  
                                                 
8 Fixed coupon bonds without call, put, sink options are the simplest form of bonds. Some bonds do not pay coupon, 
some bonds pay floating rate.  




 The pricing of risky debt has been central to the corporate finance literature. A leading 
paradigm in risky debt valuation is the structural model approach. Such approach first assumes 
the assets of the issuing firm follows certain process, e.g., a Brownian motion. Bonds are priced 
as contingent claims on the assets (Merton, 1974; Leland, 1994; Longstaff and Schwartz, 1995). 
When the value of a firm’s assets falls below a certain amount, it has to default. Credit risk 
depends on the leverage ratio, as well as how volatile that leverage ratio is. Subsequent studies 
introduced many other factors to enrich the model, namely interest rates (Longstaff and 
Schwartz, 1995), tax premium (Elton et al., 2001), systematic component (Colin-Dufresne et al., 
2001), jump risk (Zhou, 2001), direct and indirect bankruptcy costs (Warner, 1977; Altman, 
1984) and liquidity premium (Bao, Pan and Wang, 2011; Dick-Nielson et al., 2012). 
In contrast to structural models, the reduced form test models credit risk as a linear 
function of default predicting variables. For example, early accounting studies linking 
accounting ratios to credit risk can be viewed as a reduced form test. One famous example is the 
Zeta score developed by Altman (1968). Many early accounting studies show that accounting 
variables are associated with credit risk (Horrigan, 1966; Beaver, 1966; Platt and Platt, 1997). 
1.2.2 The Shift Towards Fair Value and Related Researches 
 Since accounting information is associated with credit risk, the issue arises as to whether 
historical cost or fair value information is more useful in assessing credit risk. Historical cost 
reflects the original cost of the item when on the transaction date. To understand what historical 
cost is, I briefly discuss two accounts commonly reported using historical cost, namely inventory 
and property, plant and equipment (PPE). ASC 360 measures PPE with historical purchase price 
of the PPE plus the cost necessarily incurred to bring the asset to the condition and location for 




An impairment loss shall be recognized only if the carrying amount of a long-lived asset is not 
recoverable and exceeds its fair value (ASC 360). ASC330 recognizes inventory purchase at its 
original cost, defined as the price paid to acquire an asset. Inventories are subsequently measured 
using the lower of market or historical cost. For both inventory and PPE, historical cost 
conservatively reports the lower bound of asset values.  
 In addition to historical cost, balance sheet items can be measured using fair value. FASB 
defines fair value in ASC820 as the price received to sell an asset or paid to transfer a liability in 
an orderly market transaction on the measurement date. The FASB’s definition emphasis on two 
aspects, first the price reflects a market-based exit price from buyers with the most advantageous 
use. Second, an orderly market transaction requires exposure to a liquid market for a period 
before the measurement date to allow for marketing activities. Thus, the exit price is not the 
liquidation price. Under US GAAP fair value accounting standards, except for investment and 
certain market securities, the change in fair value in subsequent periods goes into earnings, 
unless the entity elects hedge accounting for qualifying items. 
 To determine fair value, the entity needs to select an appropriate valuation technique. 
Widely used valuation techniques include the market approach, the cost approach and the income 
approach. Market approach relies on available market prices for identical or comparable assets 
and liabilities. Cost approach reflects the amount that would be required to replace the service 
capacity of an asset (often referred to as current replacement cost, i.e., an entry price). Income 
approach estimates fair value using the present value of future cash flows. The adopted valuation 
technique should be the one that maximizes the use of observable inputs. If an active market 
exists for the exact same asset or liability, the market price is the fair value (level 1). If there is 




no market information is available, fair value is estimated using valuation models with 
unobservable inputs (level 3). ASC 820-10-35 gives the highest priority to level 1 inputs and the 
lowest priority to level 3 inputs. This hierarchy implies that the FASB consider level 1 inputs 
provides the best information for users, followed by level 2 and level 3 inputs.    
The concept of fair value accounting is not new. The FASB has issued dozens of 
statements on fair value topics (Zyla 2013). However, inconsistencies related to the measurement 
and reporting of fair value exists between various FASB standards. In response to this 
inconsistency, FASB issued SFAS 157 (now ASC 820) to provide a unified framework for fair 
value measurement and disclosure. SFAS No. 157 (Now ASC 820) requires fair value adoption 
to be effective for fiscal period ending after Nov 15, 2007. While ASC 820 only focus on how to 
measure fair value, FAS 159 (now ASC 825) allows firms to elect fair value option for financial 
assets and liabilities on an item-by-item basis. 
In response to the application of fair value accounting, studies investigate the relevance 
of fair value for financial statement users. A series of studies demonstrate the usefulness of fair 
value estimates for equity valuation using the statistical association as a measure of value 
relevance (Landsman, 2007), across financial and industrial firms10. Such approach hinges on 
valuation models (e.g., Ohlson, 1995) and regress accounting variables against the stock price or 
return. But the usefulness of fair values for equity valuation may not carry over to the debt 
market. Stockholders retain all residual profit, while creditors receive no more than promised 
payments of principal and interest (Campbell and Taksler, 2003). If fair value contains 
information about the residual profit, creditors may find such information less useful. If fair 
                                                 
10 Venkatachalam (1996), Barth (1994), Barth et al. (1996), Eccher et al. (1996), Neilson (1996) examine the 
relevance of fair values for financial firms’ equity value. For non-financial firms, Easton et al. (1993), Barth and 
Clinch (1996), Barth and Clinch (1998), Muller and Riedl (2002) focused how revaluation of long-lived assets 




value conveys information about credit risk, stockholders may not fully price that in the equity 
market, while creditors may find such information useful (Dichev, 1998).  
Turning to the debt market, studies on fair value usefulness for creditors provide mixed 
evidence. Before fair value accounting standards were mandated, accounting studies already 
linked accounting-based ratios with the default probability of the firm (Horrigan, 1996; Beaver, 
1966; Platt and Platt, 1991; Altman, 1996). Debt market considerations motivate the use of 
revaluation accounting (Muller III, 1999; Brown et al., 1992; Whittred and Chan, 1992). More 
recent studies show mixed findings on fair value usefulness for creditors. Lenders find fair value 
less useful for loan contracting (Ball, Li and Shivakumar, 2015; Demerjian et al., 2016; Li, 
2010). Christensen and Nikolaev (2013) shows firms rarely voluntarily report non-financial 
assets using fair value, suggest firms think the cost of fair value reporting exceeds the benefits. A 
contradicting set of studies show that firms switch financing source from private loan to bond 
after the IFRS adoption (Florou and Kosi, 2015). Fair value-based leverage ratio better explains 
bank bond yield spread, and the source of explanatory power comes from the fair value of loans 
and deposits (Blankespoor et al., 2013). Their finding hinges on fair values of loans and deposits, 
which are not common in industrial firms. There is a lack of research in understanding how fair 
value estimates in industrial firms relate to bond pricing.  
1.3. Credit Risk Model and Hypothesis Development 
 Before discussing whether and how fair value estimates influence credit risk, how credit 
risk is priced merits some discussion. A leading paradigm in finance literature (Merton 1974) 
view debt securities as contingent claims on the firm's asset, which says debt holders obtain full 
control of the firm when the firm’s assets value falls below a threshold. With this approach, 




debt settlement value. In the bond context, bond risk premium, calculated as yield in excess of 
the risk-free rate represents the compensation demanded by the bondholders for holding risky 
debt. Bond risk premium is commonly referred to as the bond yield spread. The Merton model 
estimates bond yield spread based off the option pricing model developed in Black and Scholes 
(1973). Equations below describe the basic structure of the Merton model.  
∆𝑉 = (𝛼𝑉 − 𝐶)∆𝑡 + 𝛿𝑉 ∆𝑧                                       Equation (1) 
𝑅(𝜏) − 𝑟 =
−1
𝜏
log ( 𝑑 ∗ 𝑁(−𝑑1) +  𝑁(𝑑2))                              Equation (2) 
𝑑1 = ( 𝑙𝑛(𝑑)  +  
1
2
𝛿2𝜏 )/𝜎√𝜏               𝑑2 = ( 𝑙𝑛(𝑑)  − 
1
2
𝛿2𝜏 )/𝜎√𝜏        Equation (3)     
V = the value of the firm 
B = the specified payment of bonds on maturity date 
𝛼 = the expected rate of return in each period. 
𝑑 = 𝑉/𝐵𝑒−𝑟𝜏 
C = the total dollar payouts by the firm per unit time.  
𝛿2 = the instantaneous variance of the return on the firm’s value per unit time. 
∆𝑧 = standard Gauss-Wiener process 
R  = bond yield 
𝜏 = time to maturity 
𝑟  = risk free rate    
This credit risk model assumes the firm has two classes of claims, a single, homogenous 
class of debt and the equity. The firm promises to pay a total of B dollars to the bond holders on 
the specified date. Bondholders can immediate take over the company if the payment, B, is not 
met. Debt rollover is not allowed in this model. The model assumes that the firm fundamental 




model. Suppose IBM issues only one bond with 10-year maturity today that requires full 
payment of $100 at maturity. The firm value V, can be estimated as the sum of market value of 
equity and book value of debt, which is assumed to equal 200. The leverage ratio, 𝑑, can be 
calculated as firm value divided by debt face value, with the debt face value discounted at a 2% 
risk-free rate. An investor estimates the volatility of the total firm assets, 𝛿, at 20% using the 
standard deviation of stock returns. 𝑑2 conceptually measures the probability of default, 
assuming firm’s asset price follow a lognormal distribution. With those information, Equation 
(2) generates a bond risk premium of 1.03%, with 𝛿=20%, 𝜏=10, 𝑑=0.61, V=200, B=100.  
Merton model provides a strong theoretical basis to discuss how fair value measurement 
can be used to estimate credit risk. The accounting system can be either fair-value-based or 
historical-cost-based. Historical cost may not be very useful for creditors because the reported 
numbers on the balance sheet do not reflect market price on a timely basis. In contrast, reporting 
at fair values provide creditors with a timely measure of the values of assets. Granted that book 
assets are not always reported at the market value, such information may still help the bond 
investors to form an expectation about the distribution of firm fundamental value. 
Assets measured at fair value reflect a market-based approach. If a large percentage of 
firm’s total assets are reported at fair value, the book value of total assets can better reflect 
information related to the fundamental firm value. When applied in a credit risk model, balance 
sheet information, specifically the book value of total assets and the volatility of book assets, 
should generate a more precise measures of credit risk. Thus, the first hypothesis is stated as 
follows. 
H1: When a firm reports a large percentage of its total assets at fair value, its balance 




most of its assets at historical cost.    
ASC820 requires that the valuation technique shall maximize the use of observable 
inputs. Given the unobservable nature of level 3 inputs, fair value reported under that level are 
expected to be less reliable compared to level 1 or 2 inputs (Arora et al., 2014). However, it is ex 
ante unclear how reliability translates to relevance in the context of bond pricing. Moreover, 
many firms mention in their financial reports that cash and short-term investments closely 
approximates the historical cost due to the short-term nature. Following this argument, level 1 
assets are not expected to contain additional information because such information may not be 
new compared to historical cost, whereas level 2 and level 3 inputs incorporate both market and 
firm specific information, which is not known to the public unless disclosed via financial reports.  
H1a: Fair value assets measured with level 2 or level 3 inputs make balance sheet more 
relevant for bond pricing, compared to level 1 assets.   
The debt settlement value, B, used in the Merton model is defined as the settlement 
payment amount below which creditors can take ownership of the firm. From the credit risk 
model, an increase in the settlement value leads to an increase in credit risk. But fair value 
liabilities does not only contain the settlement value. The exit price used for fair value liability 
effectively combines the settlement value of liabilities and the nonperformance risk adjustment. 
Settlement value change, as predicted by credit risk model, should provide useful information for 
credit risk pricing. However, the nonperformance risk adjustment is negatively correlated with 
credit risk. When combined with settlement value, nonperformance risk adjustment can reduce 
fair value liability relevance for credit risk pricing. To the extent nonperformance risk may be 




H2: When a firm reports a large percentage of its book liabilities at fair value, its 
balance sheet should better explain the bond risk premium, compared to another firm 
that reports most of its liabilities at historical cost.   
1.4. Research Design 
To facilitate hypothesis testing, firms are first classified based on the extent to which the 
reporting entity makes use of fair value. I calculate fair value asset exposure as the percentage of 
items reported at fair value in relationship to total assets (A) and total liabilities (L). Both fair 
value asset exposure and fair value liability exposure are smoothed over the past 4 quarters. The 
reason for smoothing over the past 4 quarters is to provide a more stable measure. I then assign 
the highest asset (liability) exposure ever observed throughout the sample period for a firm as its 
asset (liability) exposure. Partitioning firms at the median assets exposure and liability exposure 
yields 4 groups of firms, listed below.    
 
  
Extent of using Fair Value 
(Liabilities) 
High Low 
Extent of using Fair 
Value (Assets) 
High HA, HL HA, LL 
Low LA, HL LA, LL 
This partition method has one advantage in capturing the heterogeneity in fair value 
reporting practice. The partition method minimizes partition error by using the highest possible 
exposure during the same period. With this method, the control group (LA, LL) is highly 
accurate, because those firms never report any significant fair value on their balance sheet 
throughout the sample period. Since 89% of the sample firms tend to stick with the exact same 




the case when firms do switch, Noise will be introduced to the classification method, which 
lowers the difference in goodness-of-fit. In this case, the measurement error will bias against 
finding any fit difference between groups of firms.  
The initial classification divided firms in the sample into four portfolios, namely high fair 
value asset, low fair value liability (HA, LL), low fair value asset, low fair value liability (LA, 
LL), high fair value asset, high fair value liability (HA, HL), low fair value asset, high fair value 
liability (LA, HL). 
The main test in this study compares the debt relevance of firms’ balance sheets across 
these four aforementioned portfolios. To quantify balance sheet credit relevance, two approaches 
were used. The first approach employs a credit risk model (Merton 1974) to generate a bond risk 
premium. Balance sheet information, namely the book value of total assets, the book value of 
total liabilities and the volatility of book assets, is used to make sure the predicted spread is 
purely based on balance sheet information. Additional details on variables construction is 
available in the variable definition table. Then the predicted risk premium is regressed against 
the actual risk premium to obtain a goodness of fit, i.e., R squared.  
The second approach uses the reduced form test. For each portfolio, I estimate the R 
squared of a regression between actual risk premium and two key accounting variables, namely 
the leverage ratio and book asset volatility. The selection of the two variables is based on the 
following reasons. First, leverage ratio and asset volatility are theoretically related to the credit 
risk of a firm. Leverage estimates how far the firm is away from default, while asset volatility 
captures the probability that asset value will fall below the liquidation threshold in a given 
period. Second, those two variables contain only balance sheet information, which helps to 




For each portfolio, a goodness of fit is estimated to reflect balance sheet debt relevance. 
Fair value assets relevance (H1) is tested by comparing the goodness of fit across the following 
two portfolios. When fair value liability exposure is high (HL), a comparison is performed 
between the (HA, HL) portfolio versus the (LA, HL) portfolio. When fair value liability 
exposure is low (LL), a comparison is performed between the (HA, LL) portfolio versus the (LA, 
LL) portfolio.  
To test H2, I follow the exact same test used for H1. The influence from fair value assets 
is held at either high or low. When fair value asset exposure is high (HA), comparison is 
performed between (HA, HL) versus (HA, LL). When fair value asset exposure is low (LA), 
comparison is performed between (LA, HL) versus (LA, LL). A Vuong test is employed to 
compare the R squared across portfolios, following Li (2016).  
1.5. Data 
The empirical tests mainly rely on two databases, namely Compustat and TRACE. Worth 
noting, many firms have multiple bond issues outstanding at one time, therefore bond 
transactions reported in TRACE must be matched to a corresponding issuer and its public parent 
entity in Compustat. The above procedure yields roughly 83,000 bond-quarter observations for 
712 industrial firms during the sample period from 2005 to 2014. I choose TRACE Enhance over 
regular TRACE data because the Enhance database offers more comprehensive bond trading 
information. On the date of the analysis, the TRACE enhance database covers up to 2014 
December. Following Dick-Nielson et al. (2009), duplicate, cancelled or modified trades are 
removed from the sample.   
Following the finance literature, several additional filters are applied to the bond data,. 




puttable and sinkable bonds contain embedded options that are reflected in bond price (Yu, 2005; 
Dick-Nielson et al., 2012; Elton et al., 2001). The embedded options add noise to the observed 
risk premium and must be excluded. The second filter is time to maturity. Bonds with maturity 
below 1 year are traded much less frequently and are viewed separately in the finance literature 
(Covitz and Downing, 2007), while corporate bonds with maturity over 35 years are uncommon. 
Third, financial firm’s bonds are excluded. Further, the utility sector (SIC 4900-4999) is 
excluded because the bond prices can be influenced by regulators, rather than credit risk (Eom et 
al., 2004; Prager, 1989). Fourth, a pricing error filter is applied to exclude obviously incorrect 
reported yield, following Elton et al. (2001). The average rating among sample firms were 5.77, 
which sits between A- and BBB+. Average risk premium is 1.5% for a sample period between 
2005 to 2014. Though not tabulated, there is no particular industry that dominates the sample.  
1.6. Results and Analysis  
Table 1.1 panel B summarizes the asset exposure and liability for each cell. 25% of firm-
quarter observations have low fair value exposure. Those firms (LALL group) have few assets 
and liabilities reported using fair value. In contrast, firms in the high measurement exposure 
group (HAHL group) have a mean asset exposure of 22% and a mean liability exposure of 23%. 
Table 2 suggests fair value asset exposure correlates positively to credit rating and firm size. Fair 
value liability exposure correlates negatively to rating and size.    
 Table 1.3 panel A reports how well the Merton model can predict actual risk premium 
using market-based information. This table calibrates the Merton model using market-based 
information and sets a baseline for interpretation when accounting information is used to predict 
bond risk premium. The market-based Merton model generates a risk premium, using the market 




value of debt. Details about variable construction are included in the footnotes of table 1.3. 
Results suggest that the market information (i.e., equity prices and equity volatilities) explains 
16.75% (21.32%) of the variations in bond risk premium for high (low) fair value exposure 
group. Note panel regression produces three different R squared, and the interpretation is made 
with the overall R squared. The panel regression corrects the serial correlation of errors. 
Table 1.3 Panel B reports how well balance sheet-based information can predict bond risk 
premium. Table 1.3 suggests two main messages. Compared to the market information, the 
balance sheet information has lower explanatory power for bond risk premium. This is expected 
because market information contains both accounting and non-accounting information relevant 
for bond pricing. Secondly, Table 1.3 Panel B shows that accounting variables better explains 
bond spread for borrowers with a high fair value exposure (both asset and liability exposure 
combined). In terms of economic significance, for firms with high fair value exposure, their 
balance sheets can explain 3.58% of the variance in the actual risk premium. For firms with low 
fair value exposure, their balance sheets explain 1.6% of the variance in the actual risk premium. 
Vuong test shows the difference in fit across cells is statistically significant. The results are 
similar throughout the sample period of 2005 to 2014, and after the adoption of FAS 157.  
Table 1.4 reports the results for H1. Table 1.4 panel A reports the difference in fit across 
bond portfolios between high asset firms and low asset firms, while holding fair value liability 
constant (low). Table 1.4 Panel B reports the difference in fit across bond portfolios between 
high asset firms and low asset firms, while holding fair value liability constant (high). Both panel 
A and panel B uses the credit risk model approach to estimate model fit. Results in both Panel A 
and Panel B of table 1.4 show support that fair value asset exposure enhances model predictive 




below median, the difference between the high fair value asset exposure group and low fair value 
exposure group is 4.44% in panel A, and 2.84% in panel B. The results from credit risk model 
provides support for H1.  
Table 1.4 Panel C provides results for H1 with the reduced form test. The reduced form 
model can be interpreted in a similar fashion to the credit risk model. In order to gauge the 
explanatory power from balance-sheet-based accounting variable, the reduced form model 
includes only two variables to extract the explanatory power of accounting variables. The 
reduced form test show that the model fit is consistently higher in the high asset exposure group. 
When the liability exposure is low, the fit difference is 7.85% (10.06% - 2.21%). When the 
liability exposure is high, the fit difference is 4.4% (6.32% - 1.92%). Taken together, the results 
in panel A, B and C of table 1.4 are consistent that fair value asset exposure corresponds to a 
more relevant balance sheet.  
Table 1.5 provides results that differentiates the input levels associated with fair value 
assets measured at level 1, level 2 and level 3 inputs of the Fair Value Hierarchy. For firms with 
high fair value asset exposure, I further partition those firms based on the which input level 
dominates the exposure. If level 1 asset exceeds 50% of total assets reported under fair value, I 
code this firm as a primary level 1 asset firm. With the above partition, table 5 shows that 
between the HALL and the LALL group, the explanatory power comes from fair value assets 
measured with level 2 and level 3 inputs. But there is no fit improvement across level 1 assets. 
Between the HAHL and the LAHL group, the explanatory power comes from all fair value input 
levels. Both the reduced form test and credit risk model suggest the debt relevance comes mainly 
from level 2 and level 3 assets. Worth noting, the literature on fair value estimates generally 




not translate into debt relevance. In the context of non-financial firm’s fair value assets, level 1 
assets generally consist of cash and short-term investments. Due to the short-term nature of these 
assets, the fair value and the historical cost of the cash and short-term investments will be very 
similar. In that case, the balance sheet of a historical-cost-oriented firm with cash and short-term 
investments will look similar to a high fair value firms that only carry level 1 assets. With this 
argument, one explanation of this finding is that information about fair value level 1 is already 
available in the marketplace whereas only through disclosure does the market obtain the fair 
value information for level 2 and level 3.  
Table 1.6 provides results for H2. As previously mentioned, the fair value asset exposure 
needs to be controlled to ensure clean inference for H2. Results in table 6 suggest that regardless 
of fair value asset exposure, a high fair value liability exposure does not enhance model 
predictive power. The results in table 6 do not support my prediction in H2. The reduced form 
test is partly presented in Table 4 panel C. Between the HAHL and the HALL group, model fit is 
lower by 3.74% (6.32% - 10.06%), when firms have high fair value liability exposure. For the 
LAHL and LALL group, model fit is not very different (1.92% vs. 2.21%). Both the credit risk 
model and reduced form test suggest that liabilities are more relevance when measured at 
historical cost.  
Even though fair value liability exposure generally does not improve explanatory power 
of balance sheet, it is still possible that information contained in certain levels, e.g., level 1, can 
be overpowered by noises in less reliable inputs (level 2 and level 3). Table 1.6 panel B provides 
the partition based on whether the firm report the majority of its fair value liability with either 




fit. Level 2 and level 3 fair value liability may improve model fit, but to a much less extent 
compared to fair value asset exposure.  
Based off my hypothesis and the results in table 6, it is likely that the noise contained in 
the non-performance risk overpowers the information of liability level. The nature of 
nonperformance risk reflects the issuer’s own credit risk. Since level 3 liabilities relies on firm 
specific information to develop unobservable inputs, the level information contained in the 
unobservable estimates may overpower nonperformance risk. To further explore this issue, I 
performed the same test for H2, but in a subsample where non-performance risk is minimized. 
Larger firms are less likely to default. Firms with higher rating have lower credit risk, so they do  
not have to worry about adjusting non-performance risk as much as those with lower rating. Firm 
risk, measured with equity volatility, also correlates with non-performance risk. I partition high 
fair value liability firms based on three factors that likely correlate with nonperformance risk. 
The control firms are partitioned in the same fashion to facilitate fair comparison.  
Table 1.6 panel C reports the partition based on these variables. Partitioning on size, 
credit rating and equity volatility leads to increase in model fit. Consistent with my expectation, 
the lack of fair value liability relevance is attenuated in firms with low non-performance risk.  
Taken together, results collectively suggest several messages. First and foremost, fair 
value exposure (combining fair value assets and fair value liabilities) increases balance sheet’s 
ability to explain bond risk premium. The second message is that fair value assets are more 
relevant compared to compared to fair value of liabilities. The model fit is concentrated in level 2 
and level 3 assets. Lastly, the lack of relevance is attenuated for fair value liabilities, among 





1.7. Robustness Check and alternative explanations  
Despite results in table 1.4, 1.5 and 1.6 showing support for fair value measurement for 
book assets enhance balance sheet’s usefulness for bond pricing, alternative explanations exist. It 
is possible that certain types of assets (for example, more liquid assets or current assets) are 
primarily responsible for the model fit increase, and fair value estimates happen to capture those 
particular assets.  
The results are robust to alternative model specifications. The naively calculated book 
asset volatility ignores the possibility that firm’s total assets can follow a lognormal distribution. 
Alternatively, book asset volatility is calculated as the log return of total asset for each period, 
then taking the standard deviation of the log return over the past 8 quarters, multiplied by 2 to 
produce the annualized asset volatility. Though untabulated, results are quantitatively similar 
across the credit risk model and the reduced form test.  
Model predictive power increase can come from firms with more assets with short term 
nature. FASB issued an exposure draft in 2012 on disclosure about liquidity risk and interest rate 
risk (in topic 825), which defines liquidity risk as "the risks and uncertainties that a reporting 
entity might encounter in meeting its financial obligations". Better assessment of bond issuer's 
liquidity risk can help better predict credit risk for the following reason. Consider a firm 
experiencing an increase (decrease) in liquid assets, the probability that a firm may fail to meet 
its short-term obligation will decrease (increase). Therefore, it is possible that fair value 
reporting itself does not provide information, rather bond investors use fair value reporting to 
identify assets that are more liquid (or short term in nature). If this alternative explanation holds, 




In contrast, fair value estimates of level 2 and level 3 (which reflects less liquid assets that does 
not have a direct market price quote) should not enhance model explanatory power.  
To deal with this concern, I conduct additional tests in table 1.7. Table 1.7 reports model 
fit for high fair value exposure firms that also have a high current ratio. It is ex-ante not clear 
whether the model fit improvement comes from high current ratio, or high fair value exposure. I 
further partition this group based on the fair value hierarchy of those assets. One subgroup has 
primary fair value assets (level 2 and level 3 fair value assets), another group has more short-
term assets (level 1 assets and other non-fair value assets). If the short-term nature of assets 
drives the result, I should see model fit concentrated in the more liquid assets subgroup. Results 
show that model fit improvement still holds regardless of the partition. Therefore, the fair value 
estimates fit improvement is robust to the alternative explanation.   
A potential self-selection issue can bias the measurement of model fit. Specifically, FAS 
159 allows firms to have the option to elect financial assets and liabilities using fair value, on an 
item by item basis. If the benefit of fair value reporting is higher for certain firms, those firms 
may self-select into reporting high fair value exposure. Such self-selection issue may bias the 
results. Prior studies provide relative few insights on a firm's propensity to elect fair value. If the 
factors that determines firm's decision to elect fair value also correlate with credit risk, then the 
comparison of credit risk estimation models must control for the firm's propensity to select a 
high fair value measurement exposure. Industry is likely a primary determinant for accounting 
choice. Firms operating in the same industry are subject to similar operating environment, risk 
factors and accounting rules. Reis Stocken (2007) propose a model where firms strategically 
choose fair value option in an imperfect competitive market so that firms can observe 




industry competition and firm profitability are related to the likelihood that firms elect fair value 
option.  
Untabulated Logit regression indicates that industry is the most important determinant on 
firm choice in fair value exposure. Credit rating, Size and Leverage incrementally adds to the 
pseudo R squared of 11%. While firm performance (ROA) is significant, the incremental R 
squared improvement is small. To control firm’s propensity to use fair value, I match firms with 
high fair value exposure and firms with low fair value exposure firms by the exact 2-digit SIC 
code, as well as the exact rating quartile during the fair value reporting adoption period (year 
2008 to 2009). This procedure matches 111 treatment firms to 111 control firms. Summary 
statistics demonstrates that the leverage ratio and size are not statistically different between firms 
in each group. Table 1.8 shows that after controlling for a potential self-selection issue, fair value 
estimate still enhances the explanatory power of balance sheet for bond pricing.  
1.7.1 Additional Test: The Measurement Precision Channel 
To investigate the mechanism through which fair value disclosure enhances bond pricing, 
I borrow from the test developed by Yu (2005). This test compares the term structure of the 
spread, i.e., how the risk premium changes as a function of bond maturity, between two groups 
of firms. Duffie and Lando (2001) show that the term structure of the spread for firms having 
“perfect accounting information” versus the risk premium of another set of firms having “noisy 
accounting information” are different. Duffie and Lando (2001) define perfect accounting 
information by the extent to which the reported accounting numbers track the fundamental value 
of the firm.  
In Figure 1.1, the graph on the right shows investors’ estimation of the distribution of 




firm assets volatility constant. With perfect accounting information, the probability that total 
assets dropping below the default boundary is small, especially when the bond is close to its 
maturity. Consequently, the risk premium should approach 0 if the bond is close to maturity. 
With noisy accounting information, the probability of total assets value dropping below the 
default boundary remains high as the bond moves toward maturity. Consequently, the risk 
premium remains high when the bond is close to maturity.  
 Yu (2005) provides a method to test the theory in Duffie and Lando (2001). I use a 
similar model specification to capture the term structure of the bond risk premium. 
𝑧1 = 5(𝑀𝐴𝑇 − 1)/4 𝑖𝑓 𝑀𝐴𝑇 ∈ [1,5];  5 𝑖𝑓 𝑖𝑓 𝑀𝐴𝑇 ∈ (5,30] 
𝑧2 = 0 𝑖𝑓 𝑀𝐴𝑇 ∈ [1,5]; 𝑀𝐴𝑇 − 5 𝑖𝑓 𝑀𝐴𝑇 ∈ (5,10]; 5 𝑖𝑓 𝑀𝐴𝑇 ∈ (10,30] 
𝑧3 = 0 𝑖𝑓 𝑀𝐴𝑇 ∈ [0,10]; 𝑀𝐴𝑇 − 10 𝑖𝑓 𝑀𝐴𝑇 ∈ (10,30] 


















𝑚3 = 𝑧3/20 
𝑌𝑆 = 𝑎0𝑚0 + 𝑎1𝑚1 + 𝑎2𝑚2 + 𝑎3𝑚3 
𝑌𝑆 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐿𝐸𝑉 +  𝛽2𝑉𝑂𝐿 + 𝛽3𝐴𝐺𝐸 + 𝛽4𝐿𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝑎0𝑚0 + 𝑎1𝑚1 + 𝑎2𝑚2 + 𝑎3𝑚3 + 𝑑𝑚0
+ 𝑑𝑚1 + 𝑑𝑚2 + 𝑑𝑚3 
 
The above piecewise linear function contains parameters 𝑎0, 𝑎1, 𝑎2, and 𝑎3 that captures 
the level of bond risk premium at 1, 5, 10 and 30-year time to maturity (Figure 1.2). MAT is the 
maturity of the bond. LEV is the firm’s leverage ratio, defined as the book value of debt divided 




stock price volatility. Both VOL and LEV provide an estimate of the bond’s credit risk. Bond 
age (AGE) is the difference between the bond issuance date and transaction date. LSIZE is the 
log of bond issuing size.  Both AGE and LSIZE serve as liquidity proxies, which controls for 
liquidity and its impact on the risk premium.  
 𝑑𝑚0 through 𝑑𝑚3 equals a dummy variable (High fair value exposure dummy) times 𝑚0 
through 𝑚3, respectively. The coefficients on 𝑑𝑚𝑖 represents the difference in the risk premium 
between two groups at each maturity knot (i.e., 1-year, 5-year, 10-year and 30-year).   
Lower accounting noise significantly reduces the uncertainty in estimating default 
probability, especially for bonds close to maturity. Holding everything else constant, two firms 
with varying accounting information quality will have identical term structure, except that the 
group with perfect accounting information will have lower risk premium at below 5-year 
maturity. Consistent with the theory, when both credit risk and liquidity risk are controlled, the 
term structure of high fair value asset exposure firms and historical cost firms differ in low 
maturity (Table 1.9 and Figure 1.3). Such result implies that book value of total assets, when 
measured at fair value, tracks the value of firm fundamental more closely than historical cost.  
1.8. Conclusion 
This study examines the debt relevance of fair value reporting, by comparing the debt 
relevance of a fair-value-oriented balance sheets against historical-cost-based balance sheets. 
Debt relevance is defined as association between balance sheet variables and bond pricing. Using 
industrial firm bond transactions in the secondary market between 2005 to 2014, I compare the 
ability of firms’ balance sheet to explain bond risk premium, between one group of firms with 
large percentage of total assets (liabilities) measured at fair value, against another group of firms 




Results show that book assets and liabilities, if measured at fair value, increases the 
association between balance sheet variables and the bond risk premium. Further analysis 
suggests that fair value assets contribute to the improvement in balance sheet’s explanatory 
power. The source of relevance primarily comes from level 2 assets and level 3 assets. One 
explanation of this finding is that information about level 1 assets is already available in the 
marketplace whereas only through disclosure does the market obtain information for level 2 and 
level 3 assets. One the other hand, liabilities are more relevant when measured at historical cost. 
Additional tests show that the inclusion of nonperformance risk can be one reason why fair value 
liabilities lack relevance. At last, a test similar to Yu (2005) demonstrates the mechanism 
through which fair value assets enhances the explanatory power of balance sheet.  
The evidence provided in this study are subject to several limitations. The sample firms 
used in this study are characterized as large, industrial firms with fixed coupon rate bonds. Those 
bonds are further restricted to contains no callable, puttable and sinkable features (Plain-Vanilla 
type). To the extent a material difference exists between firms that issue plain-vanilla bonds and 
those that do not, the generalizability of the results may be limited. Another limitation is that 
Merton model defines assets as the fundamental value of the firm. Using the book value of total 
assets instead of total market value leads to noisy predictions of the risk premium. Nonetheless, 
the cross validation between the structural model and the reduced form test helps to ease this 
concern. Lastly, the findings only speak to the relevance of fair value estimates for bond 





1.9. Tables and Figures 
Table 1.1 Panel A Summary Statistics 
 
 Observations  Mean Standard 
Deviation 
p25 p50 p75 
 
Bond Characteristics 
LSIZE  83,041 5.32 1.87 5.01 5.70 6.49 
Bond Maturity  82,015 10.60 8.13 4.44 7.72 15.61 
S&P Credit Rating  78,468 5.77 2.30 4 6 8 
YS_20 54,520 2.07 2.27 .94 1.52 2.35 
Predicted Spread 
(Market-based) 
79,183 0.33 0.92 0 0.01 0.18 
Predicted Spread 
(Book Based) 
79,878 1.01 2.56 0 0.14 0.81 
Firm Characteristics       
Size  81,647 10.55 1.78 9.83 10.44 11.71 
ROA  81,601 .012 .028 .005 .012 .026 
Book Asset Volatility 80,291 0.14 0.14 0.06 0.09 0.16 
Book Leverage  79,503 4.00 8.78 2.03 3.22 4.52 
Asset exposure  83,054 .097 0.12 .014 .05 .13 
Liability exposure  83,054 .084 0.17 .006 .02 .05 
 






Table 1.1 (Continued) 
Table 1.1 Panel B Asset fair value exposure rank against liability exposure rank 
 
 Extent of using Fair Value (Liabilities) 
 Low High 
Extent of using Fair Value (Assets)   
Low 
Mean Asset Exposure 
Mean Liability Exposure 










Mean Asset Exposure 
Mean Liability Exposure 










*Mean Asset exposure and mean liability exposure reported in parenthesis  




Table 1.2 Correlation Matrix 
 
 LSIZE  TTM_1  rating  YS_20  Size  ROA  Leverage  asset_ex  liab_ex  
TTM_1  0.127*** 1         
rating  -0.241*** 0.0104**  1        
YS_20  -0.083*** 0.0873*** -0.473*** 1       
Size  -0.271*** -0.00316  0.679*** -0.257*** 1      
ROA  0.112*** 0.0437*** 0.126*** -0.294*** -0.087*** 1     
Leverage 0.191*** 0.103*** 0.0195*** -0.101*** -0.129*** 0.143*** 1    
asset_ex  0.0151*** -0.058*** 0.209*** -0.065*** 0.0985*** 0.0827*** 0.158*** 1   
liab_ex  0.0768*** 0.0499*** -0.180*** 0.0318*** -0.204*** 0.0615*** 0.0144*** 0.0117**  1  
 





Table 1.3 Panel A 
Market Merton Model11 
Actual Yield Spread against predicted spread 
Pulled Regression 
 
2005- 2014 Post 157 
High Fair Value Exposure 
Overall R Squared 
Within R2/ Between R2 
Number of Observations 
 
16.75%  




14.23%/ 21.77%  
(27,723) 
Low Fair Value Exposure 
Overall R Squared 
Within R2/ Between R2 
Number of Observations 
 
21.32%  







Table 1.3 Panel B  
Balance Sheet Based Merton Model 
Actual Yield Spread against predicted spread12 
 2005- 2014 Post 157 
High Fair Value Exposure13 
Overall R Squared 
Within R2/ Between R2 
Coefficient /P Value14 
Number of Observations 
 
3.58%      





0.15% / 9.14% 
0.24 (p=0.00) 
(27,194)  
Low Fair Value Exposure 
Overall R Squared 
Within R2/ Between R2 
Coefficient /P Value 
Number of Observations 
 






0.18% / 3.69% 
0.22 (p=0.00) 
(16,717) 
Vuong Test Treat> Average fit  
Z=7.47 p=0.00 
Control < Average fit 
Z= 10.64 p=0.00 
Treat> Avg Post157  
Z=5.71 p=0.00 
Control < Avg Post157 
Z= 9.95 p=0.00 
 
  
                                                 
11 Market Based Merton model uses market-based inputs. I estimate asset volatility using annualized equity 
volatility for the past 90 days prior to quarter end, adjusted for leverage, following Campbell and Taskler (2003). 
Asset value is the sum of book value of debt and market value of equity. The model assumes 1-year risk free rate as 
the growth rate. Predicted risk premiums are winsorized at 0.5% on both ends. Treatment group are firms with both 
fair value asset exposure and fair value liability exposure above 5%.  
12 Leverage is measured using total liability (ltq). Results are similar when book debt (dlcq plus dlttq). Top and 
bottom 0.5% of predicted spread are trimmed to eliminate the effect of extreme values. 
13Treatment equals 1 if the firm, during any quarter of the sample period, have either fair value assets or fair value 
liabilities exceeding 5% of total assets(liabilities). Results are robust to various threshold values, i.e., 6% or 7% 
threshold. 
14 Reports coefficient from panel regression with between effect. The within model has relatively low R squared 




Table 1.4 Panel A 
Test of Fair Value Asset Explanatory Power (H1) 
 
 2005-2014 Post 157 
HALL 
Overall R2 
Within R2/Between R2 
Number of Observations 
Coefficient /P Value15 
 
6.34% 
1.06% / 15.68 % 
(2,385) 
0.27 (p 0.00) 
 
7.38% 
0.58% / 12.08% 
(13,815) 
0.32 (p 0.00) 
LALL 
Overall R2 
Within R2/Between R2 
Number of Observations 
Coefficient /P Value 
 
1.90% 
0.14% / 4.78% 
(17,012) 
0.28 (p 0.000) 
 
2.56% 
0.26% / 4.89% 
(13,510) 
0.26 (p 0.00) 
Fit Difference  
Vuong Test 
6.34% - 1.90%= 4.44% 
HALL vs. LL: Z=6.8  p(0.00) 
LALL vs. LL: Z=6.65 p(0.00)           
 
Table 1.4 Panel B  
 2005-2014 Post 157 
HAHL 
Overall R2 
Within R2/Between R2 
Number of Observations 
Coefficient /P Value 
 
3.74% 
0.06% / 6.37% 
(10,680) 
0.16 (p 0.00) 
 
4.02% 
0.22% / 5.76% 
(9,191) 
0.17 (p 0.00) 
LAHL 
Overall R2 
Within R2/Between R2 
Number of Observations 
Coefficient /P Value 
 
0.90% 
0.02% / 6.15% 
(10,172) 
0.14 (p 0.00) 
 
1.56% 
0% / 4.92% 
(8,416) 
0.14 (p 0.00) 
Fit Difference  
Vuong Test 
3.74% - 0.90%= 2.84% 
HAHL vs. HL: Z=3.43  p(0.00) 





                                                 




Table 1.4 (Continued) 
Table 1.4 Panel C Reduced Form Test 
Actual Spread = Book Leverage Ratio(ltq/atq) + Book Asset Volatility16  
 2005-2014 Post 157 
HALL 
Overall R2 
Within R2/Between R2 
Book Leverage17 
Book Asset Volatility 
Number of Observations 
 
10.06% 












Within R2/Between R2 
Book Leverage 
Book Asset Volatility 
Number of Observations 
 
2.21% 











 2005-2014 Post 157 
HAHL 
Overall R2 
Within R2/Between R2 
Book Leverage 
Book Asset Volatility 
Number of Observations 
 
6.32% 












Within R2/Between R2 
Book Leverage 
Book Asset Volatility 
Number of Observations 
 
1.92 % 













Z Stat P Value Significance 
HALL vs. LL 7.44 0.00 Y 
LALL vs. LL 6.68 0.00 Y 
    
HAHL vs. HL 3.31 0.00 Y 
LAHL vs. HL 9.79 0.00 Y 
 
  
                                                 
16 Book asset volatility is calculated using standard deviation of book value of total asset for the past 8 quarterly, 
then scaled by the average book value of total assets for the past 8 quarters. Multiply this measure by 2 coverts it to 
an annualized book asset volatility.    




Table 1.5  
Test of H1a: Input Levels for Fair Value Assets: HALL vs. LALL 
Holding low liability exposure constant 
 Credit Risk Model Reduce Form Test 
HALL 























Fit Difference Level 1: No Improvement 
Level 2: 9.15% 
Level 3: 1.52% 
Level 1: No Improvement 
Level 2: 14.36% 
Level 3: 16.75% 
 
Input Levels for Fair Value Assets: HAHL vs. LAHL 
Holding high liability exposure constant  
 Credit Risk Model Reduce Form Test 
HAHL 





















Fit Difference Level 1: 3.39% 
Level 2: 2.21% 
Level 3: 4.86% 
 
Level 1: 3.89% 
Level 2: 5.22% 






Table 1.6 Panel A  
Fair Value Liability Debt Relevance (H2) 
  2005-2014  Post 157 
LAHL 
Overall R2 
Within /Between R2 
Coefficient /P Value 
Number of Observations 
 
0.90% 
0.02% / 6.15% 
(10,172) 
0.14 (p 0.00) 
 
1.56% 
0% / 4.92% 
(8,416) 
0.14 (p 0.00) 
LALL 
Overall R2 
Within /Between R2 
Coefficient /P Value 
Number of Observations 
 
1.90% 
0.14% / 4.78% 
(17,012) 
0.28 (p 0.000) 
 
2.56% 
0.26% / 4.89% 
(13,510) 




LALL vs. LA: Z=13.0 p (0.00) 
LALL vs. LA: Z=2.82 p (0.00) 
  
 2005-2014  Post 
HAHL 
Overall R2 
Within /Between R2 
Coefficient /P Value 
Number of Observations 
 
3.74% 
0.06% / 6.37% 
(10,680) 
0.16 (p 0.00) 
 
4.02% 
0.22% / 5.76% 
(9,191) 
0.17 (p 0.00) 
HALL 
Overall R2 
Within /Between R2 
Coefficient /P Value 
Number of Observations 
 
6.34% 
1.06% / 15.68 % 
(2,385) 
0.27 (p 0.00) 
 
7.38% 
0.58% / 12.08% 
(13,815) 




HAHL vs. HA: Z=7.86 p (0.00) 
HALL vs. HA: Z=4.88 p (0.00) 
 
Vuong Test 
Reduced Form Test 
Z Stat P Value Significance 
LAHL vs. LA 13.00 0.00 Y 
LALL vs. LA 2.54 0.01 Y 
    
HAHL vs. HA 8.10 0.00 Y 








Table 1.6 (Continued) 
Table 1.6 Panel B 
Test of Liability Usefulness across Input Levels 
Liability exposure test: LAHL vs. LALL 
Holding low asset exposure constant 





















Fit Difference  Level 1: No Improvement 
Level 2: 1.2% 
Level 3: No Improvement  
Level 1: No Improvement 
Level 2: 2.13% 
Level 3: 7.3% 
 
Liability exposure test: HAHL vs. HALL 
Holding high asset exposure constant 





















Fit Difference Level 1: No Improvement 
Level 2: No Improvement 
Level 3: 2.15% 
Level 1: No Improvement 
Level 2: No Improvement 






Table 1.6 (Continued) 
Table 1.6 Panel C 
Fair value Liability– Nonperformance risk 
 Credit Risk Model Reduced Form 
LAHL Above Median       








Low Risk (Equity volatility) 
 




LALL18   
Large Firms 
 










Low Risk (Equity volatility) 
 




Fit Difference  Large Size: 3.28% 
Rating:        0.31% 
Risk:           2.98% 
Large Size: 4.33% 
Rating:        0.66% 
Risk:           6.49% 
 
 Credit Risk Model Reduced Form 

















HALL   














Fit Difference  Large Size:  2.41% 
Rating:       -3.31% 
Risk:              4.3% 
Large Size:  -1.93% 
Rating:        -2.92% 
Risk:             3.46%        
  
                                                 
18 To achieve median spilt for the treatment group, the LAHL vs. LALL uses log of total assets at 10, rating at 5, 
equity volatility at 23%. The HAHL and HALL group uses log of total assets at 10, rating at 6 and equity volatility 






 Credit Risk Model Reduced Form Test 
Treatment (High Current 





High Current Ratio Firms 
with Primarily Level 2 or 





High Current Ratio Firms 
with Assets that are not Level 





Control (High Current Ratio 
Firms) 






Table 1.8 Robustness Test 
 Untabulated Logit regression indicates industry is the most important determinant on firm choice 
in fair value exposure. Credit rating, Size and Leverage incrementally adds to the pseudo R 
squared of 11%. While firm performance (ROA) is significant, the incremental R2 improvement 
is small.  
 Matching Procedure: Instead of using the full sample (346 Treat and 366 Control), I match High 
and Low exposure firms by the exact sic2 and rating quartile during the FAS 157 adoption 
period. Summary statistics below demonstrates the leverage ratio and size are not statistically 
different between firms in each group. 





Leverage Ratio 0.482 0.410 t = -0.88 
pvalue 0.38 






Rating Quartile Exact matching 
 
 
Matched Treatment and Control Group 
 








                                                 
19 Treatment equals 1 if the firm has high fair value exposure, but simultaneously have a current ratio greater than 




Table 1.9 Term Structure of Bond Yield Spreads 
𝑌𝑆 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐿𝐸𝑉 +  𝛽2𝑉𝑂𝐿 +  𝛽3𝐴𝐺𝐸 +  𝛽4𝐿𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝑎0𝑚0 + 𝑎1𝑚1 + 𝑎2𝑚2 + 𝑎3𝑚3 + 𝑑𝑚0
+ 𝑑𝑚1 + 𝑑𝑚2 + 𝑑𝑚3 
 (1)  (2)  
 Group 1  HALL  
Group 2  LALL 
Group 1 HALL + HAHL   
Group 2 LALL 















































Observations  31444  41248  
R2 0.6262  0.6327  
Rating FE Y Y 
Year FE Y Y 
Clustered Standard Error Y Y 
Standard errors in parentheses  








Asset_ex  If during any quarter after the FAS 157 adoption, the reporting entity have 
fair value asset above 5%, the firm is classified as high asset exposure 
firm. Among those firms, asset exposure is measured using total fair value 
assets scaled by total assets, then averaged over a past 4 quarters. The 
maximum value of asset exposure for one firm throughout the sample 
period represents the asset exposure of the firm.  
Asset_lv123:  An indicator variable that equals to one, two or three. If level 1 (2 or 3) 
fair value assets exceed over 50% of total fair value assets, this indicator 
equals to 1 (2 or 3).  
Book Asset Volatility Book asset volatility is calculated using standard deviation of book value 
of total asset for the past 8 quarterly, then scaled by the average book 
value of total assets for the past 8 quarters. Multiply this measure by 2 
coverts it to an annualized book asset volatility.  
Control_sub  A dummy variable that captures firms with little or no usage of fair value. 
Control_sub equals 1 if during any quarter, neither the percentage of assets 
measured under value nor the percentage of liabilities measured under fair 
value exceeds 5% of total assets (total liability) 
Credit Rating  Captures the credit rating issued by S&P. Rating below B are excluded. 2 
means rating from B to BB-. 3 means BBB-. 4 means BBB. 5 means 
BBB+. 6 means A-. 7 means A. 8 means A+, AA, AA-. 9 means AA+ and 
AAA.  
Liab_ex  Liability exposure measured using total fair value liabilities scaled by total 
liabilities, in an otherwise identical way to asset_ex.  
Liab_lv123:  A indicator variable that is similarly constructed as Asset_lv123. This 
variable capture whether the firm primary use level 1, 2 or 3 inputs for 
liabilities.   
Leverage Book leverage that equals firm’s book asset divided by the sum of short 





Table 1.10 (Continued) 
Post  Dummy variable that equals to 0 for quarters before the fair value 
adoption, 1 afterwards. 
ROA  Return on asset of the firm for the concurrent reporting period 
Size  log of total assets 
YS_20 Average bond yield spread among all reported transactions between [0,20] 
calendrer days after the annual/quarterly report filing date. Yield spread 
equals the reported yield in TRACE minus the maturity matched risk-free 
(treasury) rate. 
HALL Measurement exposure is defined separately for assets and liabilities. Fair 
value asset (liabilities) exposure is the percentage of fair value measured 
assets (liabilities) scaled by total assets (total liabilities). This subsample 
has above median asset measurement exposure (5%), and below median 
liability exposure (2%) 
HAHL Firms have above median fair value asset exposure, also above median fair 
value liability exposure 
LAHL Firms have below median fair value asset exposure, but above median fair 
value liability exposure 
LALL Firms have below median fair value asset exposure, and below median fair 
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CHAPTER 2:  
THE IMPACT OF FAIR VALUE REPORTING ON A FIRM’S DEBT STRUCTURE 
2.1. Introduction 
 
Public firms in the United States rely heavily on debt financing. Earlier studies have 
shown that lenders rely on accounting information to make lending decisions.20 However, over 
time the nature and type of accounting information has shifted. The shift leads to a debate, 
related to the transition from a historical-cost-oriented balance sheet to a fair-value-oriented 
balance sheet, about whether fair value reporting is useful for creditors. Advocates of fair-value 
disclosure argue that the information is useful due to its timeliness and because it reduces 
uncertainty.  Opponents argue that fair values measured at level 2 and level 3 inputs of the Fair 
Value Hierarchy contain significant measurement errors and rely extensively on management 
discretion.21 Previous studies of fair-value debt relevance largely focus on the cost of borrowing 
and the maturity of debt instruments; this focus, though informative, does not provide a full 
picture of how firms make borrowing decisions. When firms borrow, managers consider factors 
beyond the cost of borrowing. This study examines whether fair-value reporting explains the 
cross-sectional variation in firms’ debt structures: maturity dispersion, prioritization, and the 
variety of a firm’s portfolio of debt instruments.  
A firm’s debt structure reflects important aspects of its debt financing decisions. Firms 
can choose a mix of debt instruments when they borrow, including commercial paper, bank 
credit lines, bank loans, bonds, leases, and many other types (Rauh and Sufi, 2010; Colla, et al., 
2013). Maturity dispersion, defined by how dispersed the maturities of the debt obligations are 
                                                 
20 See Altman Saunders (1998) and Bellovary, et al. (2007) for a review of existing studies on credit risk  
21 To determine fair value, various inputs can be used. Level 1 inputs are the quoted price for identical assets and 
liabilities. Level 2 inputs are based on observable inputs for similar assets and liabilities. Level 3 inputs are 




within a firm, reflects how difficult it is to refinance existing debt. Debt variety, defined by the 
variety of debt instrument types from which a firm borrows, reflects how accessible each type is 
to the firm. Debt prioritization, defined by the combination of senior and junior lenders in a 
firm’s portfolio of debt instruments, is usually found in firms with high level of information 
asymmetry.  
Those three measures of a firm’s debt structure, relate to the information asymmetry 
between the borrower and the lender (Flannery, 1986; Park, 2000; Diamond, 1991). Fair value 
has the potential to reduce information asymmetry, which impacts a firm’s debt structure. 
However, recent studies provide little evidence related to this area. Investigating the role of fair 
value information in relation to a firm’s debt structure thus fills an important gap in the literature.  
I develop three separate hypotheses regarding how fair-value reporting can influence a 
firm’s debt structure. Regarding debt variety, Flannery (1986) argues that imperfect information 
about firm’s quality prevents the market from differentiating between high-quality and low-
quality borrowers. High-quality borrowers thus prefer debt instruments that are less mispriced; 
the inverse is true for low-quality borrowers. Reporting a large percentage of the balance sheet at 
fair value serves as a signaling device that reduces information asymmetry between the borrower 
and the lender. I therefore hypothesize that the high-quality borrowers can have expanded access 
to debt instruments that are more sensitive toward new information, with the obverse true of low-
quality borrowers.  
With regard to debt prioritization, Park (2000) has shown that a high level of information 
asymmetry between the borrower and the lender, together with a high monitoring cost, motivates 
the borrower toward a prioritized debt structure. A prioritized debt structure allows the senior 




Such prioritization maximizes the senior lender’s monitoring incentive.  I hypothesize that fair-
value reporting can reduce the prominence of the senior lender by revealing private information 
related to the entity’s assets and liabilities, consequently reducing the need to have a costly, 
prioritized debt structure. 
Finally, regarding maturity dispersion, firms facing a non-trivial refinancing cost may 
choose to manage their refinancing risk by spreading the maturities of their debt instruments out 
over time (Choi, et al., 2018). Fair-value information reduces information asymmetry related to 
the borrower’s credit risk (Xu, 2017; Blankespoor, et al., 2013) and fundamental risk (He and 
Xiong, 2012), which allows creditors to obtain a high-quality signal regarding the borrower’s 
risk. I therefore hypothesize that fair value reduces refinancing risk, holding constant both 
borrower credit risk and borrower operating uncertainty.  
 The sample used for my analysis is constructed using two databases: the Compustat and 
Captial IQ debt structure databases. The Captial IQ database provides detailed information 
related to debt capital structure. I start with firms appearing in the Compustat-CRSP merged 
database from 2002 to 2014. Following prior literature, I exclude financial (SIC 6000-6999) and 
utility firms (4900-4949), as well as firms with missing total assets and total debt (dlc and dltt). 
Firms with market or book leverage outside of the unit interval are also excluded. Then those 
CCM firms are matched to the Captial IQ debt structure database. Following Colla, et al., (2013), 
I compare the Capital IQ debt information to that in the Compustat database. Firms with Captial 
IQ debt exceeding 10% of the Compustat total debt are excluded. 
To facilitate empirical analysis, I first classify firms as fair-value firms or historical-cost 
firms, based on the extent of fair-value reporting. Two variables are constructed for this purpose. 




balance sheet; this dummy variable equals 1 if a firm reports a significant percentage of assets 
and liabilities at fair value, 0 if a firm reports the majority of its balance sheet at historical cost. 
Additionally, a continuous variable measures the percentage of assets and liabilities reported at 
fair value, scaled by the sum of each firm’s total assets and liabilities.  
Controlling for factors that determine each firm’s debt structure, my results suggest that 
fair-value reporting significantly reduces the firm’s debt variety, in that fair-value firms use 
fewer types of lenders compared to historical-cost firms. Fair-value reporting also allow a firm to 
have a less prioritized debt structure, by reducing the value of having a senior lender monitoring 
the firm. Additionally, fair-value reporting reduces the maturity dispersion of a firm’s bond 
structure, lowering refinancing risk. Further analysis shows that the impact of fair-value 
reporting is stronger among firms with low or no ratings. The effects of fair-value reporting are 
largely concentrated in fair-value assets, not liabilities. Taken together, I found that evidence 
related to a firm’s tendency to use particular debt instruments is consistent with the idea that fair-
value reporting reduced information asymmetry between borrowers and lenders. 
This study contributes to the existing literature in two ways. First, it adds to the growing 
body of research on fair-value debt relevance. Previous fair-value accounting studies show that 
fair-value estimates are value-relevant for equity investors, when relevance is defined and tested 
as the incremental association between reported fair-value items and the equity price. However, 
evidence regarding fair-value debt relevance is mixed. Studies related to fair-value debt 
relevance largely focused on either bonds or bank loans and find that fair value has relevance for 
debt pricing, but not contracting. This focus ignores the heterogeneity of firms’ debt structures. 
A specific firm can have access to many types of debt instruments when borrowing (Rauh and 




investigating the relevance of fair-value reporting to a firm’s debt structure. This study shows 
that the impact of fair-value reporting on debt structures is not limited to either loans or bonds, 
rather that firms are switching between different debt sources. 
Additionally, this study contributes to the growing literature on firm debt structure, which 
attempt to explain individual firm’s decisions in arranging its debt capital structure. However, 
previous explanations are largely limited to one aspect of the debt structure, with a heavy focus 
on the choice of debt maturity or debt seniority. Focusing on three distinct aspects of firm debt 
structure, this study provides new evidences concerning the role of fair-value reporting on firm 
debt structure.  
Only a few accounting studies simultaneously examine more than two debt instruments. 
Florou and Kosi (2015) show that the IFRS adoption induces firms to rely more on bond than 
bank loans after the IFRS adoption, as they focus on issuing new debt. In addition, two other 
studies link the choice of private versus public debt to disclosure quality (Dhaliwal, et al., 2011) 
and accrual quality (Bharath, et al., 2008). My study adds to the existing literature by 
investigating debt instruments beyond loans and bonds, providing new evidence related to the 
variety, maturity dispersion, and prioritization of the debt structure of firms.  
This paper is organized as follows: section 2 reviews the existing literature related to fair-
value reporting and its debt relevance; section 3 discusses related finance theories and develops a 
hypothesis related to the impact of fair-value reporting on firm debt structure; section 4 discusses 
my research design; section 5 presents the study’s data; section 6 discusses my results; section 7 






2.2. Fair value reporting and its debt relevance 
The debate over fair-value debt relevance centers on whether historical-cost or fair-value 
information is more useful for creditors. The historical cost reflects the original cost of the item 
on the transaction date. This method can be best understood by considering two accounts 
commonly reported using historical cost: inventory and the property, plant, and equipment 
(PPE). ASC 360 measures PPE by its historical purchase price plus the cost incurred to bring the 
asset to the condition and location for its intended use. After the initial appraisal, PPE is 
depreciated based on the asset’s estimated useful life. An impairment loss is only recognized if 
the carrying amount of a long-lived asset is not recoverable and exceeds its fair value (ASC 360). 
Moving on to inventory, ASC 330 recognizes inventory purchased at its original cost, which is 
the price paid to acquire an asset. Inventories are subsequently measured using whichever is 
lower, market or historical cost. In the case of inventory and PPE, the historical cost 
conservatively reports the lower bound of the asset’s values.  
In addition to using historical cost, balance sheet items can be measured using fair value. 
FASB defines fair value in ASC 820 as the price received when selling an asset or paid when 
transferring a liability in an orderly market transaction on the measurement date. To determine 
the fair value, the entity must select an appropriate valuation technique. Widely used valuation 
techniques include the market approach, the cost approach, and the income approach. The market 
approach relies on the available market prices for identical or comparable assets and liabilities. 
The cost approach reflects the amount that would be required to replace the service capacity of 
an asset (often referred to as the current replacement cost, i.e., an entry price). The income 
approach estimates a fair value using the present value of future cash flows. The chosen 




the asset or liability, the market price is the fair value (level 1). If there is no liquid market, the 
fair value is estimated using observables inputs for similar assets (level 2). If no market 
information is available, the fair value is estimated using valuation models with unobservable 
inputs (level 3). ASC 820-10-35 gives the highest priority to level 1 inputs and the lowest to 
level 3, implying that level 1 inputs provide the best information, followed by level 2, then level 
3 inputs.    
The concept of fair-value accounting is not new. The FASB has issued dozens of 
statements on fair-value topics (Zyla, 2013). However, the various FASB standards have led to 
inconsistencies related to the measurement and reporting of fair values. In response to these 
discrepancies, FASB issued SFAS 157 (now ASC 820) to provide a unified framework for fair-
value measurement and disclosure. SFAS 157 (ASC 820) requires fair-value adoption for fiscal 
periods ending after November 15, 2007. While ASC 820 only focuses on how to measure fair 
value, FAS 159 (now ASC 825) allows firms to irrevocably elect fair-value options for financial 
assets and liabilities on an item-by-item basis. 
In trying to understand debt relevance of fair value accounting, studies on fair value 
usefulness for creditors provide mixed findings. Before fair-value accounting standards were 
mandated, accounting studies linked accounting-based ratios with the default probability of the 
firm (Horrigan, 1996; Beaver, 1966; Platt and Platt, 1991; Altman, 1996). Debt market 
considerations motivates the use of revaluation accounting (Muller III, 1999; Brown, et al., 1992; 
Whittred and Chan, 1992). After the shift towards fair-value accounting, the evidence becomes 
mixed. One set of studies find that fair value lacks contracting usefulness, because banks exclude 
fair-value-based covenants (Ball, Li, and Shivakumar, 2015; Demerjian, et al., 2016; Li, 2010). 




leverage ratio better explains bank bond yield spread (Blankespoor, et al., 2013). However, those 
findings largely focused on the pricing or contract terms of one particular type of debt 
instrument, which does not provide a full picture of a firm’s choices about its debt structure. This 
study attempts to fill this important gap in the literature.  
2.3. The Debt Structure of Firms and Hypothesis Development 
A firm’s debt structure reflects a critical aspect of its financing decisions. Firms can 
obtain debt financing with multiple types of debt instruments, including commercial paper, bank 
credit lines, bank loans, public bonds, and capital leases (Rauh and Sufi, 2010). Surprisingly, a 
large body of literature views debt as a homogeneous claim. In practice, debt is heterogenous: 
debt instruments differ in terms of maturity, seniority, and lender type. The finance literature 
provides both theoretical support for and empirical evidence of the heterogeneity of debt 
structure. Relevant to this study are theories concerning debt variety (Diamond, 1991a; Flannery, 
1986), debt prioritization (Park, 2000), as well as the maturity dispersion of debt types (Choi, et 
al., 2018; Dass and Massa, 2014). 
2.3.1 Hypothesis on fair-value reporting and debt variety  
Flannery (1986) argues that imperfect information about a firm’s quality does not allow 
the market to differentiate between high-quality and low-quality borrowers. The market interest 
rate thus corresponds to the average borrower quality. Consequently, high-quality firms are 
always undervalued and low-quality firms are always overvalued. To minimize the cost of 
borrowing given this mispricing, high-quality borrowers prefer to choose debt instruments 
insensitive to new information, such as short-term bank loans. Low-quality borrowers instead 
prefer to borrow using information-sensitive debt instruments, like bonds, to take advantage of 




maturity, but also to the choice of debt instruments, depending on the instrument’s sensitivity 
towards new information.  
 Fair-value estimates can reveal private information about reported assets and liabilities. 
Reporting most of the balance sheet at fair value serves as a signaling device that reduces 
information asymmetry between the borrower and the lender. Consequently, high-quality 
borrowers are no longer limited to debt instruments that are least-mispriced. They may expand 
their debt financing to debt types that are more sensitive to new information, such as public 
bonds.  
H1: High-quality borrowers, when disclosing a large portion of assets and liabilities at 
fair value, will have expanded access towards a wide range of debt instruments, 
particularly those more sensitive towards new information.    
However, for low-quality borrowers, the effect of fair-value reporting can be different. 
With lowered information asymmetry, low-quality borrowers can no longer take advantage of 
market mispricing. Low-quality borrowers may be limited to debt types that are short-term and 
less sensitive to new information.  
H1a: Low-quality borrowers, when disclosing a large portion of assets and liabilities at 
fair value, can be confined to debt instruments that are less sensitive towards new 
information.    
 However, managers may misrepresent fair-value accounting information to further their 
self-interests. This, together with the potential large measurement error associated with fair-value 
estimates, could weaken and even reserve the effects in H1 and H1a if lenders find fair-value 





2.3.2 Hypothesis on fair-value reporting and prioritized debt structure 
Firms with high leverage and low credit ratings typically have both senior bank loans and 
junior claims in the debt capital structures (Rauh and Sufi, 2010). Firms with a prioritized debt 
structure have multiple tiers of debt, including secured, senior unsecured, and subordinated 
issues. A prioritized debt structure exists, as demonstrated in Park (2000), because it can 
maximize the senior lender’s monitoring incentive. Park (2000) considers settings in which the 
moral hazard is so severe that no lending will take place unless costly external monitoring is 
applied. The senior lender’s monitoring incentive is maximized in a prioritized debt structure, as 
there are no lenders more senior, so he appropriates the full return from monitoring. Having a set 
of junior claims also increases this incentive because the senior-tier debt receive the first gains 
resulting from monitoring, while the junior creditors receive nothing. 
According to Park (2000), two reasons motivate firms to incur the additional costs to 
obtain a prioritized debt structure. First, the high level of information asymmetry between the 
borrower and lender leads firms to choose a costly prioritized debt structure. Second, the senior 
lender (usually a bank) in the prioritized debt structure adds value because financial 
intermediaries (banks) have access to the borrower’s private information and can easily monitor 
and renegotiate debt contracts, as compared to junior creditors.  
Fair-value reporting can reduce the value added from the senior lender, by revealing 
private information related to the entity’s assets and liabilities, which would otherwise be 
unavailable to outsiders. With lowered information asymmetry, having a senior lender 
employing costly monitoring using private information can be less valuable. Therefore, reporting 
a fair value can reduce the debt priority structure of a firm, particularly for those with a low 




H2: Firms with a low credit rating and high leverage, when disclosing a large portion of 
assets and liabilities at fair value, will have a more specialized (less prioritized) debt 
structure, whereas otherwise identical firms likely have a more prioritized debt structure.  
2.3.3 Hypothesis on fair-value reporting and maturity dispersion 
Debt maturity dispersion, as described in Diamond (1991a), reflects the risk that a firm 
may not be able to refinance its existing debt. This refinancing risk arises because short-term 
debt matures before cash flows arrive, leading to reduced investment and inefficient asset 
liquidation (Almeida, et al., 2011). Issuing a lump-sum debt with a single maturity date saves 
fixed cost related to debt issuance (Altinkilic and Hansen, 2000), but increases refinancing risks. 
Therefore, firms can choose to manage refinancing risks by spreading the maturities of multiple 
debt instruments over time (Choi, et al., 2018).  
The finance literature identifies several causes of refinancing risk. A borrower’s credit 
risk increases refinancing risk, because speculative-grade firms usually plan for early refinancing 
before their debt matures (Xu, 2017). A firm’s fundamental risk, especially the volatility of its 
assets, can also increase refinancing risk (He and Xiong, 2012). Hartford, Klasa, and Maxwell 
(2013) show that refinancing risk is related to cash holding, and argue that refinancing risk is 
amplified by timely updates regarding credit risk.  
Fair-value estimates can impact refinancing risk by providing timely signals related to the 
firm’s fundamental and credit risks. Bond investors have relatively high renegotiation and 
monitoring costs compared to banks (Park, 2000; Diamond, 1991b), so bond investors are 
cautious because  they face an adverse selection issue. If fair-value information reduces 
information asymmetry related to the borrower’s credit risk (Blankespoor, et al., 2013) and asset 




to an otherwise identical historical-cost-based firm. Consequently, bond investors are more likely 
to extend debt to the borrower, holding borrower credit risk and operating uncertainty constant.  
H3: Firms disclosing a large percentage of assets and liabilities at fair value likely face 
lower refinancing risk and thus have less dispersed maturity profiles compared to 
historical-cost firms, especially for risky firms with low rating and high leverage.  
 Dass and Massa (2014) offers an alternative explanation for maturity dispersion, 
considered from a lender’s perspective. Institutional lenders, the largest players in corporate 
bond lending, face significant information collection costs. These lenders face a tradeoff between 
having an information advantage (knowledge about the borrower) and investment diversification. 
For example, large firms like IBM may issue up to twelve bonds with different maturities to 
cater to institutional investors’ investment needs. Large firms with dispersed maturity structures 
increase the cost of borrowing because of the fixed costs related to each bond issuance 
(Altinkilic and Hansen, 2000). Fair-value reporting reveals private information regarding a 
firm’s assets and liabilities, and can thus reduce information search costs. With these reduced 
information collection costs, institutional investors can include more firms in their portfolios, 
with increased diversification, whereas borrowers can save fixed costs related to bond issuance 
by issuing fewer and larger bonds.  
H3a: Fair-value disclosure allows firms to have a less dispersed maturity structure, 
through its ability to reduce the lender’s information collection costs, especially for large 
and highly-rated firms. 
2.4. Research Design 
To facilitate hypothesis testing, firms are first classified based on how they make use of 




assets and fair-value liabilities, scaled by the sum of total assets and total liabilities. For each 
firm, this measure is averaged throughout the reporting period when fair-value estimates are 
available. A dummy variable, HFV, equals 0 if the firm’s fair-value exposure never exceeds 5%, 
and equals 1 otherwise. The high correlation between a firm’s fair-value exposure and the lagged 
fair-value exposure indicated that it mainly captures a cross-sectional variation, rather than a 
time-series variation of the firm’s reporting practice.   
Related to a firm’s debt structure, I construct variables to capture distinct features of a 
firm’s debt structure. Debt variety reflects a firm’s choice among different types of debt 
instruments. Based on the information in Capital IQ, debt instruments are categorized into 
commercial paper, revolving lines of credit, bank loans, subordinated bonds, senior bonds, 
capital leases, and other types. Two measures of debt variety are constructed. The first measure 
counted the total number of debt types in the categories above for each firm-year observation. 
The second measure is the log of the inverse of the Herfindahl Index (HHI), based on the weight 
of debt instruments in each category. Both measures are increasing in debt variety.  
The measure of Maturity dispersion captures the concentration of a firm’s debt 
instruments based on the distribution of maturities. Following Choi, et al. (2018) and Dass and 
Massa (2014), two measures are constructed. The first measure is the log of the inverse of the 
Herfindahl Index (HHI) of the firm’s debt instruments with different maturities. The second 
measure first grouped a firm’s debt instruments into different maturity bins, based on their time 
to maturity, then a formula quantifies how distant the firm’s maturity distribution was from a 
hypothetical firm that had a uniformly distributed maturity structure. Both measures are 




Debt prioritization captures whether a firm’s debt instruments is prioritized, defined as 
having creditors with different seniority. Each debt instrument is categorized into the following 
five bins based on seniority: secured debt from banks, secured debt from non-bank lenders, 
general senior unsecured debt, subordinated debt, and convertible debt. Convertible bonds, once 
converted, will become equity and have lower priority than debt instruments. Therefore, 
convertible bonds were classified as having the lowest priority. The first measure counts the 
number of debt instruments in each bin. The second measure calculates the Herfindahl Index 
(HHI) of the firm’s debt instruments based on the weights of debt instruments in each seniority 
bin. Then it takes the log of the inverse of the Herfindahl Index. The two measures are increasing 
in firm’s debt prioritization.  
To test the hypotheses that fair value can impact debt variety, debt prioritization, and 
maturity dispersion, I use the following OLS regression. 
𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 (𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑡𝑦, 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛, 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛)  =  𝐹𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒  +  𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠  
Using methods established in prior literature, control variables include market-to-book, 
leverage, size, industry, credit rating, the firm’s performance, and the firm’s operating risks 
(Dass and Massa, 2014; Colla, et al., 2013). To control for industry-specific reporting practices, I 
add fixed effects using two-digit SIC codes. To mitigate the concern that a firm’s debt structure 
can follow a time trend, year-fixed effect is also included. Variables are constructed following 
standard definitions in the literature and winsorized at 1% and 99%.  
2.5. Data 
The sample used for the analysis is constructed using two databases: the Compustat and 
Capital IQ debt structure databases. Consistent with prior literature, I begin with firms appearing 




and regulatory requirement of financial and utility firms, I further exclude financial (SIC 6000-
6999) and utility firms (4900-4949), as well as firms with missing total assets and total debt (dlc 
and dltt). Firms with market or book leverage outside of the unit interval are also excluded. The 
remaining firms are merged with the Capital IQ debt structure database. 
The Capital IQ database contains information on detailed capital structures, including the 
description of debt issues, debt issue type, principal amounts due, maturity dates (or ranges of 
maturity), and the filing documents used to construct debt issue information. Capital IQ groups a 
firm’s debt instruments into the following types: commercial paper, revolving credit, term loans, 
bonds and notes, capital lease, and other borrowings.  
Problematically, Capital IQ data contains duplicates of some debt instruments. I first 
retain the latest available filings for each reporting period. When there are multiple filings for a 
given period end date, I clean duplicates by the following variables, namely the principal amount 
(DataItemValue), data descriptions (descriptiontext), debt maturity (maturityhigh and 
maturitylow), interest rate (interestratehighvalue), data item description ID (descriptionID) and 
component ID (componentid). Once the Capital IQ data is merged with Compustat, following 
Colla, et al., (2013), observations with Capital IQ debt exceeding 10% of Compustat total debt 
are excluded. This merging creates 34,581 firm-year observations covering 6,000 firms from 
2002 to 2014. If a firm did not survive past the FAS157/159 adoption quarter, there will be no 
fair-value information. After removing those firms, the final sample for analysis consists of 
28,878 firm-year observations from 2002 to 2014.  
2.6. Results and Analysis 
 Table 2.1 shows the summary statistics. About 31% of the sample firms are classified as 




fair value. For fair-value firms, the mean fair-value exposure is 18.5%, whereas historical firms 
have much lower (1%) fair-value exposure.    
In terms of debt capital structure, specifically debt variety, an average firm in the sample 
uses 2.6 types of debt instruments. Related to debt prioritization, statistics suggest that 34% of 
the firm-year observations have more than one type of creditor, and thus a prioritized debt 
structure. Regarding maturity dispersion, a firm with equal weights (33%) of debt instruments 
with three different maturities has an MV1 of 0.47, which is close to the sample median. These 
statistics shows that a typical firm’s debt capital structure can be heterogenous.  
More importantly, a firm’s debt structure can vary based on its credit rating. Firms with 
high ratings rely on bond financing (Diamond, 1991; Rahu and Sufi, 2010), whereas firms with 
low or no ratings rely on other sources of debt that suffer less from information asymmetries. 
Figure 1 further suggests the importance of investigating a firm’s debt structure.  
Table 2.2 shows the correlation matrix between the variables that capture a firm’s fair-
value reporting practice and that firm’s debt structure. Fair-value reporting is negatively 
correlated to the firm’s debt variety, debt prioritization, and maturity dispersion. Further, large 
firms are not more likely to utilize fair-value reporting, whereas firms with large investment 
opportunities (mtb), lower performance (ROA), and lower ratings tend to rely more on fair-value 
reporting.  
Table 2.3 provides a test for H1, utilizing an OLS regression. Fair value exposure is 
negatively and significantly related to debt variety, suggesting that fair-value firms tend to rely 
on fewer types of debt instruments. Results are consistent when a dummy variable is used instead 
of the continuous measure of fair-value exposure. Results are consistent when debt variety is 




significance, a two standard deviation change (0.24*1.5= 0.36) corresponds to 13.8% change in 
debt variety (DV1). The economic significance, when interpreted with a dummy variable, is of 
similar magnitude to the continuous variable. 
Notably, fair value can be applied to both assets and liabilities. Columns 3 and 6 of Table 
2.3 report the regression when fair-value assets and fair-value liabilities are separated. These 
results suggest that the impact of fair-value reporting on debt variety mainly comes from fair-
value assets. Reporting liabilities at fair-value has little effect on debt variety.  
The predictions made in H1 and H1a suggest that the effect of fair-value reporting can 
vary between high- and low-quality borrowers. Diamond (1991) and Flannery (1986) suggest 
that credit ratings can be used to differentiate firm types. Figure 2.1 suggests a large difference in 
debt structure starts to emerge across firms with different credit ratings. Table 2.3, Panel B 
compares the effect of fair-value reporting between high-quality and low-quality firms. Contrary 
to my prediction, high-quality firms do not expand their debt types, rather they become more 
concentrated, borrowing from fewer debt sources. Thus, Table 2.6 performs additional tests on 
the impact of fair-value reporting among firms with different credit ratings, which will be 
discussed later. 
In terms of debt prioritization, Table 2.4 provides evidence supporting H2. Debt 
prioritization, when measured with either a count measure or the Herfindahl Index, is lower for 
fair-value firms. Results are consistent when either a dummy or a continuous variable is used to 
capture fair-value reporting. Results are robust when different fair-value exposure thresholds are 
used, namely 5%, 10%, and 15%. In terms of economic significance, the reporting fair value 
reduces DP3 by 0.03, similar to the impact compared to the continuous variable. An impact of 




effect of fair-value reporting on prioritization change in a subsample of firms that has no or low 
ratings and high leverage is much stronger. This effect reflects 10% change on the mean value of 
DP4. The differential impact of fair-value reporting across firms with different ratings and book 
leverage provides strong support for H2.  
In terms of maturity dispersion, Table 2.5 provides evidence related to H3. Based on 
empirical evidence and theoretical support, maturity dispersion reflects firm’s refinancing risk. 
H3 predicts that fair value reduces refinancing risk, and thus fair-value firms have a less-
dispersed maturity profile. Table 2.5, panel A shows that, consistent with the prediction, debt 
dispersion, measured with either the Herfindahl Index or the distance to a perfectly-dispersed 
debt structure, is lower for fair-value firms. Results are consistent when either a dummy or a 
continuous variable is used to capture fair-value reporting. Since the hypothesis concerns the 
maturity dispersion related to bonds only, Table 2.5, panels B and C repeat the same test for the 
maturity dispersion, calculated only for bonds. Notably, the sample size here is smaller because 
not all firms have access to the bond market. Additionally, the effect of such a change comes 
mainly from assets measured at fair value, not liabilities. 
2.6.1 Additional Tests 
A series of tests further investigates the details related to each debt structure measure, to 
better understand the effect of fair-value reporting. On debt variety, Table 2.3 suggests that for 
both high-quality and low-quality firms, fair-value reporting reduces debt variety. To further 
explore what exactly is happening to a firm’s debt structure, Table 2.6 shows fair-value reporting 
impacts debt financing from different types of borrowers. Table 2.6 tests whether fair-value 
reporting influences a firm’s decision to use a particular debt type: commercial paper, revolving 




Table 2.6 suggests that the effect of fair-value reporting on debt variety is not limited to 
bank loans and bonds. The effect of fair-value reporting varies across firms with different credit 
ratings. H1 and H1a predict that fair-value reporting has different impacts on high-quality and 
low-quality firms. Consistent with H1, for highly-rated firms, fair-value reporting is associated 
with less use of information-insensitive sources (term loans and revolving credit line), and more 
use of information-sensitive debt type (senior bonds). Prior studies find that firms switching from 
loans to bonds, but the statistics show IG firms do not rely much on loans (8% of total debt), 
compared to their heavy reliance on bonds (73% of total debt). 
For low-rated and unrated firms, which are likely low-quality firms, the effect of fair-
value reporting is stronger and more complicated. Fair-value reporting is associated with less use 
of bank sources (term loans and revolving credit line), and more use of subordinated bonds and 
capital leases. Consistent with H1a, low-quality firms rely more on capital leases, the least 
information-sensitive debt type. US bankruptcy code implies that the lessor has advantage over a 
secured lender in regaining control of an asset (Eisfeldt and Rampini, 2009, Barclay and Smith, 
1995b), making capital leases less sensitive towards new information, as compared to secured 
bank loans. As Brennan, et al. (1988) argue, convertible bonds, which contains both straight debt 
and an option to convert, are relatively insensitive toward borrower risk. When borrower risk 
increases, the straight debt declines in value and the conversion option increases in value. 
Consistent with H1a, low-quality firms rely more on convertible bonds, which have low 
sensitivity towards borrower risk. 
Table 2.4, panels C and D present the impact of fair-value reporting on debt 
prioritization, adding to the main effect that fair-value reporting reduces debt prioritization. 




priority class: bank-secured debt, non-bank secured debt (mostly capital leases), general senior 
unsecured debt, subordinated bonds, and convertible bonds. Consistent with my hypothesis, the 
effect of fair-value reporting on debt prioritization is largely concentrated in low-quality firms. 
Park (2000) argues that when banks are the only senior lender maximizes the lender’s monitoring 
incentive. Indeed, fair value firms rely less on secured bank sources. Low-quality firms reporting 
fair value rely more on capital leases and convertible debt, less on bank loans and senior bonds. 
Table 2.4, panel E focusses on below-investment-grade firms, which has a rating less or 
equal to 3. As suggested in my previous analysis, the fair-value reporting effect is largely 
observed in this subsample. However, a large portion of this subsample primarily rely on debt in 
the same priority class (DP4 equals 1). For firms with multiple tiers of debt (DP4 > 1), a 
regression on each debt-priority class provides consistent evidence that firms rely less on bank-
secured debt sources.  
Table 2.5, panel B reports three separate regressions, with the dependent variable being 
the weight of debt in three maturity bins. H3 predicts that maturity dispersion should decrease 
with fair-value reporting. Table 2.5, panel B provides additional evidence that the reduction of 
dispersion happens in long-term debt instruments with maturities over 10 years. While the 
concentration likely comes from a reduced reliance on short-term and mid-term bonds, the 
coefficients are negative, but not statistically significant. When the analysis is restricted to bonds 
only, consistent with my prediction, fair-value firms had fewer mid-term bonds and more long-
term bonds, resulting in a more concentrated maturity profile.   
2.6.2 Robustness Test 
Despite strong evidence showing that fair-value reporting is related to firm’s debt 




mechanically correlated with the percentage of financial assets. If a firm chose to hold a large 
percentage of financial assets, it may have a high fair-value exposure as well. To alleviate this 
concern, I first sort observations based on the firm’s choices of financial assets, defined as the 
sum of cash (and equivalents) and accounts receivable, scaled by its total assets. Firms are then 
grouped into ten bins, based on the percentage of financial assets. Firms in each bin have similar 
percentage of financial assets but different fair-value exposure. Table 7 reports the regression 
results for each bin. The results suggest that for firms with low financial assets, the effect of fair-
value exposure is small. This is expected because fair-value exposure (FAS 157 and 159) mostly 
applies to financial assets. Table 2.7 shows that fair-value exposure has a significant impact on 
debt structures, while holding financial assets constant in each bin. 
Potentially, the three dependent variables can be interdependent and the errors in the 
three separate regressions can be correlated. When estimated independently, the correlated errors 
may bias the coefficients of interest. To address this concern, I use a seemingly unrelated 
regression (SUR). Table 8 shows that when SUR is applied, the coefficients of fair-value 
exposure does not change much, compared to the reported coefficients in Tables 2.3, 2.4, and 
2.5.  
To further mitigate the concern that fair-value firms and historical-cost firms can differ in 
firm characteristics that correlate with debt structure choices, I perform an entropy balance 
matching, which rearranges the weight of the observations in the control group, making the 
weighted mean and variance almost identical across the treatment and control groups. Table 2.9 
reports the summary statistics of the fair-value firms and historical-cost firms before and after the 




panel B shows that all three debt structure variables yield consistent coefficients in Tables 2.3, 
2.4, and 2.5, though the magnitude of the coefficients is slightly smaller. 
2.7. Conclusion 
This study examines whether fair-value reporting explains the cross-sectional variation in 
a firm’s debt structure. The prior literature largely ignored the heterogeneity of a firm’s debt 
structure, treating debt as though it is of only one type. Borrowing from theories from the finance 
literature, I hypothesize and test the impact of fair-value reporting on three distinct features of 
the debt structure: maturity dispersion, debt variety, and debt prioritization. 
The sample used for the analysis is constructed using two sources, namely the Compustat 
and Capital IQ debt structure databases. Compustat contains firm characteristics and fair-value 
reporting practices, whereas Capital IQ data contains detailed information on firms’ debt 
structures.  
Related to debt variety, fair-value reporting is negatively associated with the number of 
debt types, a two standard deviation change (0.24*1.5= 0.36) corresponding to a 13.8% change 
in debt variety. Results suggest that the impact of fair-value reporting on debt variety mainly 
comes from fair-value assets. Reporting liabilities at fair-value exposure has little effect on debt 
variety. Table 2.6 suggests that the effect of fair-value reporting on debt variety is not limited to 
bank loans and bonds. For low-rating and unrated firms, which are likely low-quality firms, fair-
value reporting is associated with less use of bank sources (term loans and revolving credit 
lines), and more use of subordinated bonds and capital leases. 
Debt prioritization, when measured with either the count measure or the Herfindahl 
Index, is lower for fair-value firms. In terms of economic significance, the reporting fair value 




Consistent with the hypothesis related to debt prioritization, the effect of fair-value reporting is 
largely concentrated in low-quality firms. For low-quality firms, fair-value firms have lower debt 
prioritization, as they rely more on capital leases and convertible debt, instead of bank loans and 
senior bonds. 
Results show that maturity dispersion, when measured with either the Herfindahl Index 
or the distance to a perfectly dispersed debt structure, is lower for fair-value firms than historical-
cost firms. The effect of these changes mainly comes from assets measured at fair value, not 
liabilities. An additional test reveals that the reduction of dispersion happens in long-term debt 
instruments with maturities over ten years.  
This study provides important and new evidence related to fair-value reporting on a 
firm’s choice on debt structure. The analysis is robust to alternative model specifications. The 
robustness tests mitigate the concern that financial assets can be correlated with fair-value 
reporting. Moreover, seemingly unrelated regression alleviates the concern that the errors in the 
three separate OLS regressions can be correlated. However, the choice fair-value reporting can 
be endogenous. After matching on factors correlated with both firms’ tendency to hold financial 






2.8. Tables and Figure 
Table 2.1 Summary Statistics 
 Observations Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
p25 p50 p75 
HFV  28878 .3152919 .4646401 0 0 1 
Avg_firm_exp  28878 .0655906 .1175584 .0015992 .014989 .0731216 
DP4  28878 1.391336 .5922387 1 1 2 
DP3  28791 .213755 .2922119 0 .0284071 .4133158 
DV1  28878 2.609391 1.237801 2 3 3 
DV2  28791 .3128877 .3300112 0 .1961414 .6010149 
MV4  26881 2.92265 1.045791 2.100061 2.777043 3.607044 
MV1  26983 .5496583 .5765842 0 .4310231 .9458513 
Fin_at_pct  28739 .3022891 .2057004 .1482225 .2564398 .4082438 
MTB 28878 2.820744 4.450302 1.17192 1.966316 3.335952 
Size  28878 6.592424 2.059693 5.125736 6.596566 7.986898 
ROA  28875 -.0197483 .2085887 -.0238343 .0347179 .0732787 
Credit Rating  28878 1.893518 1.301176 1 1 2.846154 






Table 2.2 Correlation Matrix 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
 HFV avg_firm_exp DP4 DP3 DV1 DV2 MV4 MV1 fin_at_pct mtb size ROA rating 
 
HFV  1              
avg_firm_exp 0.696*** 1            
DP4  -0.074*** -0.094*** 1           
DP3  -0.076*** -0.101*** 0.923*** 1          
DV1  -0.166*** -0.222*** 0.382*** 0.418*** 1         
DV2  -0.139*** -0.165*** 0.617*** 0.670*** 0.609*** 1        
MV4  -0.073*** -0.150*** 0.208*** 0.223*** 0.497*** 0.333*** 1       
MV1  -0.080*** -0.146*** 0.223*** 0.237*** 0.493*** 0.362*** 0.938*** 1      
fin_at_pct 0.293*** 0.456*** -0.163*** -0.177*** -0.336*** -0.251*** -0.329*** -0.310*** 1     
mtb  0.0720*** 0.097*** -0.069*** -0.076*** -0.054*** -0.063*** -0.026*** -0.024*** 0.136*** 1    
size  -0.003  -0.111*** 0.018*** 0.023*** 0.415*** 0.158*** 0.594*** 0.581*** -0.350*** -0.0125** 1   
ROA  -0.110*** -0.254*** -0.018*** -0.017*** 0.143*** 0.0594*** 0.179*** 0.153*** -0.276*** -0.008 0.371*** 1  
rating  -0.028*** -0.101*** -0.046*** -0.042*** 0.372*** 0.104*** 0.545*** 0.546*** -0.243*** 0.032*** 0.721*** 0.223*** 1 
 






Table 2.3 Panel A 
Debt Variety 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  






















































































avg_L    
0.107 
(0.078)  















Observations  28875  28875  28875  28788  28788  28788  
Adjusted R2 0.3392  0.3362  0.3445  0.1505  0.1496  0.1531  
       
SIC2 fixed effects, year dummy included, with standard errors clustered  
by each firm  
Standard errors in parentheses, 




Table 2.3 (Continued) 
Table 2.3 Panel B  
Debt Variety – Differential effect in Unrated Firms 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  
























Controls Included Y  Y  Y  Y  
Observations  28875  28875  28788  28788  
Adjusted R2 0.3405  0.3362  0.1517  0.1499  
Standard errors in parentheses  
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01  
 
 
Table 2.3 Panel C 
Fair Value Impact on Debt Variety 
 Debt Weight 
(Mean Value) 
Fair Value Effect 
 
Unrated   




Term Loans 29%  
Senior Bonds 24%  
Capital Leases 11%  
   
HY   




Term Loans 25%  
Senior Bonds 46%  
   
IG   
Term Loans 8%  




Table 2.4 Panel A 
Debt Prioritization 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  


























































































avg_L    
0.029 
(0.020)  















Observations  28788  28788  28788  28875  28875  28875  
Adjusted R2 0.1397  0.1382  0.1406  0.1206  0.1195  0.1212  
       
SIC2 fixed effects, year dummy included, with standard errors clustered by each 







Table 2.4 (Continued) 
Table 2.4 Panel B 
Prioritization - Subsample 
 (1)  (2)  














































Observations  28788  28875  
Adjusted R2 0.1471  0.1265  
   
Standard errors in parentheses  









































Table 2.4 Panel C 
Each Prioritization Tier weight- by rating 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  
 w_DP1  w_DP2  w_DP3  w_DP4  w_DP5  























      












Adjusted R2 0.1352  0.0939  0.1192  0.0508  0.0789  
      












Adjusted R2 0.1668  0.1321  0.1575  0.1273  0.1975  
      












Adjusted R2 0.1651  0.0667  0.1552  0.0533  0.0915  
Standard errors in parentheses  




Table 2.4 (Continued) 
Table 2.4 Panel D 
Fair Value Impact on Debt Prioritization - Details 
 
 Weight of Debt 
Priority class 
(Mean Value) 
Fair Value Effect 
Unrated   
Bank Secured 40%  
NonBank Secured 21%  
General Sr Unsec 35%  
Sub Unsec 1%  
Sub Convertible 3%  
   
HY   
Bank Secured 30%  
NonBank Secured 14%  
General Sr Unsec 42%  
Sub Unsec 9%  
Sub Convertible 5%  
   
IG   
General Sr Unsec 88%  






Table 2.4 (Continued) 
Table 2.4 Panel E 
Debt Prioritization - Details 
Subsample, Non-investment grade firms 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  













Observations  14626  14626  14626  14626  14626  
Adjusted R2 0.1554  0.1106  0.1480  0.0539  0.0952  
      












Observations  8549  8549  8549  8549  8549  
Adjusted R2 0.0979  0.0990  0.0922  0.1442  0.0700  
Controls include mtb, size, ROA, rating, book leverage, time dummy  
And SIC2 industry fixed effects. Standard error clustered by firm 
Standard errors in parentheses  






Table 2.5 Panel A 
Maturity Dispersion 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  






















































































avg_L    
-0.024 
(0.034)  















Observations  26980  26980  26980  26878  26878  26878  
Adjusted R2 0.4295  0.4274  0.4292  0.4148  0.4119  0.4141  
       
SIC2 fixed effects, year dummy included, with standard errors clustered  
by each firm  
Standard errors in parentheses  






Table 2.5 (Continued) 
Table 2.5 Panel B 
Fair Value Impact on Maturity Ranges 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  
 MV_st  MV_mid  MV_lt  
Maturity range (years) 
in each bin 
[0,5] [5,10] [10,35] 
Mean weight of debt 
of each bin 

























































Observations  27358  27358  27358  
Adjusted R2 0.0910  0.0749  0.0767  
Standard errors in parentheses  
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01  
When limiting the analysis to bonds maturity dispersion (*avg_firm_exp, second row), results 
shows that fair value effect is concentrated in bonds maturity dispersion, more than other types 







Table 2.5 (Continued) 
Table 2.5 Panel C 
Maturity Dispersion (Bonds Only) 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  






















































































avg_L    
-0.101* 
(0.053)  















Observations  18823  18823  18823  17720  17720  17720  
Adjusted R2 0.3951  0.3947  0.3945  0.2801  0.2795  0.2800  
SIC2 fixed effects, year dummy included, with standard errors clustered  
by each firm  
Standard errors in parentheses  







 Table 2.6  
Debt types in firms with different credit rating 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  
 SUB 
Bonds  
























Observations  28875  28875  28875  28875  28875  28875  28875  
Adjusted R2 0.0841  0.0890  0.1497  0.1036  0.2630  0.1443  0.0207  
















Observations  18119  18119  18119  18119  18119  18119  18119  
Adjusted R2 0.0840  0.0132  0.1012  0.0700  0.0673  0.1370  0.0248  
















Observations  5056  5056  5056  5056  5056  5056  5056  
Adjusted R2 0.2221  0.0418  0.1694  0.1958  0.1958  0.0979  0.0748  
















Observations  5700  5700  5700  5700  5700  5700  5700  
Adjusted R2 0.0830  0.1223  0.1420  0.1154  0.1483  0.1436  0.1043  
SIC2 fixed effects, year dummy included, with standard errors clustered  
by each firm  
Standard errors in parentheses  







Separate Regression for Each Financial Asset Bin 
 Bin of Financial Assets  
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  
Financial Assets 
Mean Value 

























Adjusted R2 0.4411  0.4409  0.3854  0.4067  0.4046  0.4050  0.3572  0.3022  0.3210  0.1181  

























Adjusted R2 0.1610  0.1768  0.1913  0.1577  0.1444  0.1257  0.1247  0.0895  0.1032  0.0766  

























Adjusted R2 0.3764  0.3576  0.3296  0.2725  0.2336  0.2932  0.2419  0.2214  0.2248  0.2235  
Observations  2776  2779  2779  2770  2746  2692  2688  2627  2526  2374  
SIC2 fixed effects, year dummy included, with standard errors clustered  
by each firm  
Standard errors in parentheses  







Seemingly Unrelated Regression 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  
































































Observations  26477 26477 26477 
Year and SIC2 fixed effects included, but unreported 
Standard errors in parentheses  







Entropy Balanced Matching 
 
 HFV Firms Control Firms 
 Mean Variance Mean Variance 
Before Matching     
Bk_lev 0.23 0.20 0.27 0.19 
Size 6.55 2.02 6.61 2.08 
Fin_at_pct 0.39 0.24 0.26 0.17 
ROA -0.06 0.26 -0.002 0.18 
Mtb 3.30 5.09 2.60 4.10 
Rating 1.82 1.29 1.93 1.30 
Observations 9105  19773  
After Matching     
Bk_lev 0.23 0.20 0.23 0.20 
Size 6.55 2.02 6.55 2.02 
Fin_at_pct 0.39 0.24 0.39 0.24 
ROA -0.06 0.26 -0.06 0.26 
Mtb 3.30 5.09 3.30 5.08 
Rating  1.82 1.29 1.82 1.29 







Table 2.9 (Continued) 
Table 2.9 Panel B 
Entropy Balanced Treatment and Control 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  


















































Observations  28736  28736  26757  
Adjusted R2 0.3508  0.1236  0.4316  
Standard errors in parentheses  









Avg_firm_exp  A continuous variable generated using the reported fair value estimates 
after FAS 157/159 adoption. This variable is defined as the sum of fair 
value assets and fair value liabilities scaled by the sum of total assets and 
total liabilities, then averaged for each firm for all Post FAS157 periods. 
HFV The dummy variable equals 1 if firm’s average fair value exposure, 
defined as the sum of fair value assets and fair value liabilities scaled by 
the sum of total assets and total liabilities, exceeds 5%, 0 if the firm’s fair 
value exposure never exceeds 5% 
Size Log of firm’s total assets  
MTB Market to Book Ratio, defined as csho*prcc_q/(at-lt) 
Bk_lev Book Leverage, defined as sum of total debt ( dlc + dltt) over total assets 
Fin_at_pct Percentage of financial assets (cash and equilvelnts plus receivables), 
scaled by total assets 
Sd_prcc Standard deviation of the log return of fiscal year end stock prices, as a 
proxy for firm’s asset volatility 
Zscore Altman (1986) Zscore measure, as a proxy for firm credit risk 
Rating  Credit rating equals 1 if the firm is unrated or below B-, 2 if the firm is 
rated as B-, B, or B+. 3 if the firm is rated as BB-, BB, or BB+. 4 if the 
firm is rated as BBB-, BBB, and BBB+. 5 if the firm is rated as A-, A, A+, 
AA-, AA, AA+, AAA. Firm may not always have rating for every 
reporting period, if missing, average rating is throughout the sample 
period is calculated and used.  
DP4 Each debt instrument is categorized into the following 5 bins based on the 
seniority, namely secured debt from banks, secured debt from non-bank 
lenders, general senior unsecured debt, subordinated debt, and convertible 
debt. This measure counts the number of debt instruments in each bin if 





Table 2.10 (Continued) 
DP3 Calculates the Herfindahl Index (HHI) firm’s debt instruments based on 
the weights of debt instruments in each seniority bin. Then it takes the log 
of the inverse of the Herfindahl Index 
DV1 Debt variety measure, defined as the number of the debt types in the 
following categories, namely commercial paper, revolving line of credit, 
bank loans, subordinated bonds, senior bonds, capital leases and other 
types 
DV2 Herfindahl Index (HHI) based on the weight of debt instruments in each 
category, namely commercial paper, revolving line of credit, bank loans, 
subordinated bonds, senior bonds, capital leases and other types. Then it 
takes the log of the inverse of the Herfindahl Index. 
MV1 Calculated as the log of the inverse of the Herfindahl Index (HHI) firm’s 
debt instruments with different maturities. 
MV4 Firm’s debt instruments are grouped into different maturity bins based on 
their time to maturity. For debt instruments with maturity below 10 years, 
each year is a maturity bin, followed by 3 more maturity bins for debt 
between 10 to 15 years, 15 to 20 years and longer than 20 years, 
respectively. Then a formula quantifies how distant the firm’s maturity 
distribution is from a hypothetical firm that has a uniformly distributed 
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